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Article

Standing Voting Instructions:
Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor
Jill E. Fisch †
INTRODUCTION
Institutional investor voting is a hot topic. Academics debate
the efficacy of institutional activism. 1 Issuers malign the voting
behavior of institutions that blindly follow the recommendations
of proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) and Glass Lewis. 2 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labor (DOL) caution institutional investors that voting the shares of their portfolio companies is a fiduciary responsibility.3
† Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I am grateful for thoughtful feedback from Chuck Callan and Steve Norman,
and to Broadridge for providing me with access to its retail and institutional
voting platforms. Early drafts of this paper were presented at the University of
Pennsylvania Ad Hoc Faculty Workshop, the UC Berkeley Faculty Workshop,
the AALS Section on Securities Regulation, the 2017 UC Berkeley/University
of San Diego Workshop, and Navigating Federalism in Corporate and Securities
Law at Tulane Law School. I received many helpful comments at each session.
Copyright © 2017 by Jill E. Fisch.
1. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (offering empirical evidence about the effects of shareholder activism on long-term firm
value); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (2014) (questioning the hypothesis that empowering activist shareholders will increase long-term shareholder value).
2. See, e.g., Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advising
Firms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t-Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 5–6 (2013) (written testimony
of Darla C. Stuckey, Senior Vice President of Policy & Advocacy, Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals), http://financialservices
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba16-wstate-dstuckey-20130605.pdf (describing reports from issuers that their investors follow proxy advisor recommendations without questioning them).
3. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (discussing Department
of Labor Avon letter and SEC rulemaking).
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In contrast, no one cares very much about retail investor
voting.4 With institutional investors holding a growing percentage of publicly traded shares, 5 the limited propensity of retail
investors to vote their shares,6 and the economic cost of reaching
out to individual investors to solicit their proxies, the retail vote
has been all but forgotten. 7
The ability of retail investors, if engaged, to have a meaningful effect on the outcome of a shareholder vote is one reason
to reconsider this approach. 8 The 2015 proxy contest at DuPont
offers an example. In a closely-contested election in which hedge
fund activist Trian nominated four candidates for the DuPont
board, DuPont emerged victorious. 9 Although many large institutional investors, as well as the major proxy advisory firms,

4. See Frank G. Zarb Jr. & John Endean, Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case for “Client Directed Voting,” HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/14/
restoring-balance-in-proxy-voting-the-case-for-client-directed-voting (observing
that “the absence of retail investor participation” is an ignored “fundamental
defect” in corporate proxy voting). But see Daniel M. Gallagher, Opening Statement at the Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 19,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/opening-statement-proxy-voting
-roundtable-gallagher.html (expressing particular interest in hearing “if there
are ways in which the Commission can improve retail shareholder participation
in the proxy process”).
5. John Endean, The Untapped Power of Individual Investors, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-endean-the-untapped-power
-of-individual-investors-1412543380 (quoting BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 2 (2d ed. 2014), http://
proxypulse.broadridge.com/proxypulse/assets/docs/broadridge-pwc-proxypulse
-2nd-edition-june2014.pdf (stating that institutional investors own 70% of the
shares of U.S. companies)).
6. See BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PROXY SEASON
PREVIEW 3 (1st ed. 2015), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge
-PwC-ProxyPulse-1st-Edition-2015.pdf (reporting that retail investors vote only
29% of their shares, while institutional investors vote 90%).
7. See James McRitchie, Retail Shareholder Proxy Participation: Part 2 –
CDV, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
4-681/4681-4.pdf (“In the 1940s and 1950s thousands of [retail] shareowners
frequently showed up for shareowner meetings.”).
8. See, e.g., BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 3 (1st ed. 2016), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/
ProxyPulse-First-Edition-2016.pdf (“Data continues to show that engagement
of the retail investor base can play an instrumental role in the outcome of a
shareholder meeting.”).
9. See Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board
Fight, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont
-appears-poised-to-win-over-peltz-1431521546.
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supported some or all of the Trian slate, none of Trian’s nominees was elected.10 According to both Nelson Peltz and DuPont
CEO Ellen Kullman, DuPont’s victory was due, in part, to the
support of its retail investors. 11
A second reason to reconsider the importance of retail investor voting is the virtual elimination of discretionary broker voting. 12 Prior to 2010, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 452
permitted brokers to cast votes on most issues with respect to
shares that they held as custodians if they did not receive voting
instructions from the beneficial owner. 13 The NYSE gradually
narrowed the scope of this discretionary voting authority. 14 By
January 2012, brokers were barred from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to uncontested director elections, say-on-pay, and charter and bylaw amendments.15 Now,
with respect to all of these issues, if shareholders do not provide

10. Id.
11. Jeff Mordock, Retail Shareholders Cited as Key to DuPont’s Victory,
DELAWAREONLINE (May 13, 2015), http://delawareonline.com/story/money/
business/2015/05/13/trian-rebuffed-dupont-slate-wins-seats/27226613. See also
Ronald Orol, Why DuPont Beat Nelson Peltz in the Biggest Proxy Fight in Years,
THESTREET (May 20, 2015), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13158047/3/why
-dupont-beat-nelson-peltz-in-the-biggest-proxy-fight-in-years.html (quoting
Bruce Goldfarb, CEO of proxy solicitor Okapi Partners, stating that the vote by
retail investors was “possibly a real factor in the decision”).
12. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (describing the process
by which NYSE reduced the scope of discretionary broker voting).
13. NYSE Rule 452, 1996 WL 34424015, 1. The rule authorized discretionary broker voting for so-called routine issues. See also Order Approving NYSE
Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33293, 2 n.7 (July 1, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf (explaining the scope of Rule 452, prior to the
2009 amendments). Thus, brokers were not allowed to vote uninstructed shares
with respect to matters such as proxy contests or mergers. Id. at 5 n.14 (listing
non-routine matters under Rule 452).
14. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. Previously, in 2003, the
NYSE amended Rule 452 to ban discretionary voting with respect to approval
of equity compensation plans. See Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed
Rule Changes Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-48108 1, 7 (June 30, 2003) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 3448108], https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48108.htm.
15. Memorandum from NYSE Regulation to all NYSE & NYSE Amex Equities Members & Member Orgs. (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.nyse.com/
publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/rule-interpretations/2012/12-4.pdf (explaining
that these subjects “going forward will be treated as ‘Broker May Not Vote’ matters” under NYSE Rule 452).
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their brokers with voting instructions, their shares will not be
voted at all. 16
A final, and perhaps most important, reason to provide retail investors with a meaningful opportunity to vote their shares
is to preserve the legitimacy of shareholder voting in reducing
managerial agency costs and maintaining director accountability. 17 Recent regulatory changes and the rise of shareholder activism have made shareholder voting power increasingly important. 18 Shareholders today vote on a growing range of issues,
such as executive compensation 19 and shareholder-nominated
director candidates. 20 Recent developments in Delaware corporate law provide that director decisions that have been approved
by an informed shareholder vote are largely insulated from judicial oversight.21 Yet current voting outcomes do not reflect the
preferences of all shareholders. Currently, 91% of institutional
shares are voted, but voting turnout by retail investors averages
less than 30%.22

16. Shares for which a broker has not received voting instructions are typically called broker “non-votes.” LATHAM & WATKINS, CLIENT ALERT: RECOMMENDED PROXY DISCLOSURE FOR DIRECTOR ELECTIONS AND OTHER PROPOSALS,
4 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-recommended
-proxy-disclosure. As long as there is at least one routine matter being voted on
at the shareholders meeting—such as the ratification of the auditing firm—broker non-votes may be counted toward a quorum. Id.
17. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.
1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
18. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897–901 (2013) (explaining how activist shareholders
are able to leverage their power by attracting the voting support of more passive
institutional investors).
19. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9178; 34-63768, 1 (Apr. 4,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf (adopting amendments
to the Rules providing for shareholder approval of executive compensation).
20. See, e.g., SKADDEN, PROXY ACCESS: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2016 PROXY
SEASON (June 28, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/sites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2
Fpublications%2FProxy_Access_Highlights_of_the_2016_Proxy_Season.pdf
(describing the increasing adoption of proxy access provisions that enable shareholders to nominate director candidates on the issuer ’s proxy statement).
21. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del.
2015) (rejecting a challenge to a merger where the merger had been approved
by a fully informed shareholder vote).
22. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 2 (Sept. 2017), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017proxy-season-review.pdf.
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Low retail turnout allows institutional investors to dominate election results,23 but there are reasons to believe that retail investor voting preferences differ systemically from those of
institutional investors. According to at least some commentators, retail investors are more likely to support management 24
and to vote in favor of executive compensation plans. 25 These differences matter. Although institutional investors hold the majority of voting stock of publicly traded companies, retail shareholders own enough shares to make a difference; in many cases,
a voting threshold of 20% to 30% can have a critical effect on the
issuer.26 In addition, regardless of whether retail shareholders

23. See Matt Egan, Just 27% of Investors Bother To Vote, CNN MONEY
(June 12, 2014), http://buzz.money.cnn.com/2014/06/12/shareholders-dont-vote
(stating that poor turnout by retail investors means “their voices are being
drowned out by large institutions on hot-button issues”); Dominic Jones, Did Eproxy Figure in Apple’s Surprise Say-on-Pay Loss?, IR WEB REPORT (Mar. 5,
2008), http://www.irwebreport.com/20080305/did-e-proxy-figure-in-apples
-surprise-say-on-pay-loss (“Low retail turnout has the effect of amplifying the
votes of institutional activist investors.”).
24. See, e.g., Mary Ann Cloyd, How Well Do You Know Your Shareholders?,
HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2013), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/18/how-well-do-you-know-your-shareholders
(“Retail shareholders support management’s voting recommendations at high
rates.”); See Neil Stewart, Retail Shareholders: Looking Out for the Little Guy,
IR Magazine (May 15, 2012), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/
shareholder-targeting-id/18761/retail-shareholders-looking-out-little-guy (reporting that retail investors are more likely to support management than institutions). But see BRUNSWICK GROUP, A LOOK AT RETAIL INVESTORS’ VIEWS OF
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND WHY IT MATTERS (July 2015), https://www
.slideshare.net/Brunswick/retail-investors-views-of-shareholder-activism
-summary-of-results (reporting, based on results from a survey of 801 retail investors, that the majority believe activists add long-term value, and may thus
be more likely to support activists than generally thought).
25. See BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at 2
(“Among the companies that failed to attain majority shareholder approval for
executive compensation plans, retail investors cast 66% of their votes in favor
of these plans while institutions cast 65% of their votes against.”); David Bogoslaw, Retail Investors Seen as Key to Firms Struggling on Say-on-Pay, Says
ProxyPulse, IR MAGAZINE (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/
proxy-voting-annual-meetings/19800/retail-investors-seen-key-firms
-struggling-say-pay-says-proxypulse (stating that retail investors showed
greater support for say-on-pay plans than institutional investors).
26. See Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 100–02 (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable/proxy-votingroundtable-transcript.txt [hereinafter 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable] (providing Alan Beller ’s comments stating that retail is important now because of withhold vote campaigns, in which directors who get less than 70% support can wind
up leaving the board); Id. at 91 (providing Reena Aggarwal’s comments stating
that “twenty to thirty percent dissent votes can make a big difference”).
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vote differently from institutional voters, voting results should
convey the views of all shareholders.
Although there are many plausible reasons for the low voting rate among retail investors, 27 the mechanics of the voting
process are likely a substantial factor. Institutional investors
can vote their stock easily and inexpensively. 28 ISS and other
third party services provide voting platforms that enable institutions to authorize the voting of their shares in advance—either
in accordance with customized voting guidelines or in accordance
with a proxy advisor or management recommendation—and to,
in essence, automate the voting process. 29 Retail investors have
no such option and must submit separate voting instructions in
connection with each shareholder meeting through a process
that is cumbersome in many cases is not directly linked to an
investor’s brokerage account, and provides no mechanism for
creating across-the-board instructions or voting policies.30 It is
little wonder that the level of retail voting is low and continues
to fall. 31
In addition to disenfranchising retail shareholders, the fact
that, on average, 20% of shares are unvoted may disserve issuers. 32 As Scott Hirst has observed, low turnout may prevent issuers from making governance changes that are supported by
both boards and shareholders, due to their inability to obtain the
necessary vote threshold. 33 The problem arises because shareholder approval of many issues requires support by a majority or

27. See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 57–
87 (2016) (attributing low voting rates by retail investors to rational apathy).
28. See Endean, supra note 5 (highlighting the efficient features of institutional voting).
29. See infra notes 62–73 and accompanying text (describing the process by
which market providers and intermediaries facilitate the institutional voting
process).
30. See generally Zarb & Endean, supra note 4 (stating that the voting process is “simply more burdensome” for retail investors than it is for institutions).
31. See Egan, supra note 23 (“A paltry 27% of retail investor shares were
voted during the fall 2013 proxy election season. That’s even worse than the
turnout in U.S. political elections—57.5% of eligible U.S. citizens participated
in the 2012 presidential election.”).
32. See Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 102 (2017)
(finding a median turnout of 81% in director elections for Russell 3000 companies).
33. See id. at 112–16 (discussing proposed amendments to company charters that received more than 90% of the votes cast, but failed due to supermajority requirements).
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supermajority of outstanding shares.34 Unvoted shares count as
votes against the proposal.35 The problem of so-called “frozen
charters” is particularly acute in that issuers frequently include
provisions in their Initial Public Offering (IPO) charters that restrict the rights of public shareholders, such as classified boards
or dual class voting structures.36 Low voter turnout may prevent
issuers from removing these provisions when they are no longer
valuable. 37
One possible way of increasing the level of retail investor
voting is to permit retail investors the opportunity to submit
standing voting instructions (SVI), also known as client-directed
voting. 38 Because most modern shareholders hold their stock in
street name, their votes are cast by intermediaries on the basis
of their voting instructions. 39 Current SEC rules prohibit intermediaries from soliciting SVI from their customers, however. 40
Because of these rules, although most institutional investors
have access to an Internet-based voting platform that permits
them to designate their voting instructions in advance, retail
shareholders are unable to do so.
34. Charters of 88% of IPO companies in 2015 contained supermajority provisions for approving mergers or amending the charter or bylaws. WILMER
HALE, 2016 M&A REPORT 4 (2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/
Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2016-WilmerHale-MA
-Report.pdf.
35. See Hirst, supra note 32, at 101 (“Most supermajority requirements are
a percentage of shares outstanding, rather of the votes cast on the proposal.”).
36. See, e.g., Joseph A. Hall, The Impact of ISS’ New Policy on IPO Company Director Elections, HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/10/the-impact-of-iss
-new-policy-on-ipo-company-director-elections (reporting results of survey finding that “IPO companies continue to adopt charter provisions such as a classified board or dual class stock that can be viewed as having an anti-takeover
impact, without any noticeable impact on valuation or marketing”).
37. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
38. The term client-directed voting was coined by Steve Norman in 2006.
James McRitchie, An Open Proposal for Client Directed Voting, HARV. L. SCH.:
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 14, 2010), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2010/07/14/an-open-proposal-for-client-directed-voting. Commentators have also used the term advance voting instructions or AVI. See, e.g., Luis
A. Aguilar, Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders, Statement by
SEC Commissioner, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sec
.gov/news/statement/021915-psclaa.html. This paper will use the term SVI to
refer to all such proposals.
39. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and
the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or
Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683, 704 (1988) (describing this procedure).
40. See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
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As early as 2007, the SEC’s Proxy Working Group considered rule changes to facilitate SVI. 41 To date, however, the SEC
has failed to change its rules to allow retail investors to designate their voting instructions to a broker or voting platform in
advance in the same manner as institutional investors. Rather,
SVI has been characterized as highly controversial. 42 Commentators have raised concerns about its implementation 43 and,
more fundamentally, about its potential for contributing to uninformed shareholder voting. 44
This Article considers these concerns. First, the Article explores and rejects the claim that the risk of uninformed voting
justifies the SEC’s failure to remove the regulatory obstacles to
SVI. Second, the Article reflects on the appropriate safeguards
for the implementation of SVI that would minimize the potential
for adverse effects on the voting process. Notably, reforming retail investor voting by implementing SVI could make retail investor voting both more efficient and better informed.
Rather than citing these concerns or the complexity of SVI
as a basis for preventing its use by retail investors, 45 the Commission should adopt regulatory reforms not just to remove existing impediments but to integrate SVI into the process by
which brokers solicit voting instructions. Such regulation would
41. See AUGUST 27, 2007 ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
DATED JUNE 5, 2006, at 4–5, http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/

files/NYSE%20PWG%20Report%20Addendum%208-27-2007_0.pdf [hereinafter ADDENDUM] (describing the Working Group’s consideration of Steve Norman’s proposal for client-directed voting).
42. See, e.g., KIMBERLY K. RUBEL & BREE F. ARCHAMBAULT, DRINKER BIDDLE, SECURITIES UPDATE: PROXY PLUMBING CONCEPT RELEASE – A MOVE TOWARD PROXY PROCESS REFORM? 7, 11 (Sept. 2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
documents.lexology.com/01135a5e-45ca-4ea4-a0b0-39fe28fa47bf.pdf (describing SVI as “[t]he most controversial proposal to increase retail participation discussed in the [SEC’s 2010] Concept Release”).
43. See ALAN L. BELLER, JANET L. FISHER & REBECCA M. TABB, COUNCIL
OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., CLIENT DIRECTED VOTING: SELECTED ISSUES AND DESIGN PERSPECTIVES 12–15 (Aug. 2010), http://www.cii.org/files/publications/
white_papers/08_31_10_client_directed_voting_white_paper.pdf (describing potential advantages and disadvantages of implementing SVI).
44. See RUBEL & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 42, at 11 (explaining that SVI
“creates a tension with the policy objective of obtaining informed investor
votes”); Aguilar, supra note 38, at 5 (describing uninformed voting as “one of the
fundamental concerns that have been previously raised about so-called ‘advance
voting instructions’”).
45. Cf. BELLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 2 (“ The complexity of CDV and the
policy and regulatory issues it entails suggest to us that a robust CDV model is
likely to have a long gestation period . . . .”).
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reinforce the growing importance of shareholder voting. In addition, it would encourage greater retail investor engagement in
corporate governance, which may serve as a useful counterpoint
to the increasing empowerment of institutional investors.46
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article briefly
surveys the background of shareholder voting and the developments that have led to the current devaluation of the retail investor. Part II describes the SVI model and evaluates the concerns that have been raised about SVI. Part III critically
examines the regulatory objective of informed shareholder voting and the role of that objective in the regulatory debate over
SVI. Part IV identifies appropriate safeguards for the implementation of SVI.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING
A. LEGAL AND MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER
VOTING
In 1932, Berle and Means published the classic The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, in which they identified the
central challenge posed by the corporate form as the separation
of ownership and control. 47 The corporation to which Berle and
Means referred was owned by dispersed public shareholders
with small stakes. 48 Indeed, Berle and Means argued that these
small stakes prevented shareholders from holding management
accountable.49 The dispersed model of corporate ownership persisted—as recently as the early 1950s, institutional investors
owned less than “10% of the stock of the 1000 largest, public companies.” 50

46. This Article takes as a given the existing role of shareholder voting in
corporate governance and does not address the normative question of whether
the existing level of shareholder power reflected in the voting process is optimal.
For differing viewpoints on that issue, compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that
shareholders should have greater power to make corporate decisions), with William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) (arguing against increased shareholder
power).
47. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
48. Id. at 47–65.
49. Id.
50. SUNEELA JAIN, BARBARA BLACKFORD, DONNA DABNEY & JAMES D.
SMALL, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL BALANCE IN THE REL-
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Today, the situation has changed. Institutional investors
own a substantial majority of the shares of public companies.51
At the largest issuers, institutional ownership exceeds 70%. 52 As
a result of their substantial voting power, institutional investors
have become increasingly important. Issuers engage frequently
with institutional investors, 53 and this engagement has an effect
on firm decisions.54 Some commentators have argued that, in
fact, the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors has transformed corporate governance away
from the Berle and Means focus on managerial agency costs, to
a new system of agency capitalism in which the agency costs of
institutional intermediaries have become more important than
the managerial agency costs upon which Berle and Means focused their attention.55
A variety of regulatory developments contributed to increased institutional investor engagement in the voting process.
In 1988, the DOL issued the so-called Avon Letter, the first of a
series of statements advising the managers of pension funds that
proxy voting was an important component of their fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA. 56 The DOL followed up with several
ATIVE ROLES OF
ANCE OF PUBLIC

MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS, AND INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNCORPORATIONS? 9 (2014), http://www.shareholderforum.com/
access/Library/20140306_ConferenceBoard-Paper.pdf.
51. See, e.g., BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at
1 (“During the 2015 mini-season [July 1–Dec. 31], institutional investors owned
62% of the street shares of U.S. companies, compared to 38% for retail investors.”).
52. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PROXY SEASON
WRAP-UP 3 (3d ed. 2015), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge
-2015-proxy-season-wrap-up.pdf (noting that institutional ownership varies by
issuer size and that, as of 2015, institutions owned 72% of large issuers).
53. See MARC GOLDSTEIN, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., DEFINING ENGAGEMENT: AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES 4 (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www
.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/engagement-between
-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf (describing trends in level
and type of engagement between issuers and investors).
54. Craig Doidge, Alexander Dyck, Hamed Mahmudi & Aazam Virani, Collective Action and Governance Activism 34 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2635662, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635662 (reporting findings
that institutional investor ’s “activism through private engagements has an impact, both in terms of value when its formation was announced, and in changing
actual governance policies including majority voting, say-on-pay, compensation
practices, and incentive pay”).
55. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 18.
56. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23,
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interpretive guidelines reinforcing this position.57 In 2003, the
SEC adopted rules requiring mutual funds to develop policies
and procedures with respect to voting shares in their portfolio
companies and to disclose their votes on an annual basis. 58 As a
result of these regulations, a substantial percentage of institutional investors began to take proxy voting more seriously. 59
Many institutional investors with substantial equity interests
allocated specialized resources to analyzing governance issues
and making voting decisions. 60 Because institutional investors
control a substantial number of votes, their policy concerns generate considerable public attention. 61
Market providers responded to increased institutional investor involvement in voting by providing them with new tools
to facilitate the proxy voting process. 62 ISS developed into the
most important intermediary, on a global basis, providing institutional investors with a variety of services to assist them in exercising their voting power. 63 ISS is perhaps best known for its

1988), in 15 PENS. REP. (BNA) 371, 391 (Feb. 29, 1988) (“The decision[s] as to
how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”).
57. In 2008, the Department of Labor issued clear guidelines that stated,
“the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock
includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of stock.”
Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017); Id. § 270.30bl-4.
59. See generally INDEP. DIR. COUNCIL & INV. CO. INST., OVERSIGHT OF
FUND PROXY VOTING (July 2008), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_08_proxy_voting
.pdf (explaining requirements for mutual fund directors to oversee proxy voting
by their funds and practices used by directors to engage in that oversight).
60. See, e.g., Kirsten Grind & Joann S. Lublin, Vanguard and BlackRock
Plan to Get More Assertive with Their Investments, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-and-blackrock-plan-to-get-more
-assertive-with-their-investments-1425445200 (describing governance engagement by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, and noting that large mutual
fund companies own sufficient stakes to be taken seriously by their portfolio
companies).
61. Id. See also Joann S. Lublin, BlackRock Toughens Stance on Boards,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-to-take
-tougher-stance-on-u-s-corporate-directors-1425414807 (reporting BlackRock’s
announcement that “it may oppose board members’ re-election over such issues
as excessive tenure, insufficient diversity, poor short-term attendance and corporate bylaw changes that ignore investor rights”). BlackRock manages $4.65
trillion in assets. Id.
62. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009) (describing
developments at proxy advisory firms and the history and growth of ISS).
63. Id. at 649, 652.
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advisory services; it provides its investor-subscribers with information about issues on which they are being asked to vote, as
well as recommendations as to how to vote. 64 ISS Voting Analytics collects and analyzes data about institutional voting policies,
voting results, and patterns.65 In recent years, a second major
proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis, has gained prominence for the
information and recommendations that it provides to subscribers. 66
Market intermediaries also offer institutional investors
tools to simplify the mechanics of the voting process. 67 ISS offers
a service to its subscribers called ProxyExchange that permits
them to outsource the mechanics of the voting process including
executing ballots and maintaining voting records. 68 Glass Lewis
provides its clients with Viewpoint, a web-based voting platform. 69 Broadridge offers ProxyEdge, an Internet-based system
that allows institutional investors to “[m]anage, track, reconcile
and report [their] proxy voting through electronic delivery of ballots,” and “[s]atisify SEC requirements regarding vote reporting
and record keeping.” 70
64. Id. at 652.
65. ISS VOTING ANALYTICS, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss
-analytics/voting-analytics (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
66. After ISS, Glass Lewis has the next largest client base. See Stephen J.
Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2010) (evaluating the influence of ISS and Glass
Lewis); see also Ed Batts, Proxy Advisory Firms in Legislative Crosshairs,
LAW360 (July 8, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/815410/proxy-advisory
-firms-in-legislative-crosshairs (observing that the market for proxy advisory
services is “dominated” by two firms: ISS and Glass Lewis). A number of additional firms provide advisory services that focus outside of the U.S. markets.
See Elizabeth Judd, A Guide to Proxy Advisers, IR MAGAZINE (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/20359/
guide-proxy-advisers (identifying and describing a number of non-U.S. proxy
advisory firms).
67. Proxy advisors have been subject to criticism both for the quality of the
advisory services that they provide and for potential conflicts of interest. See,
e.g., Choi et al., supra note 62, at 657–58 (describing accounts of advisor conflicts
of interest). In response, SEC staff released guidance to institutional investors
with respect to their reliance on proxy advisors. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 20 (IM/CF ) (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm.
68. PROXYEXCHANGE, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/proxy
-voting-services/proxy-exchange/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Proxy
Exchange).
69. Proxy Voting – Viewpoint, GLASS LEWIS, http://www.glasslewis.com/
proxy-voting (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Viewpoint).
70. ProxyEdge, BROADRIDGE, https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/
broadridge-proxyedge-complete-proxy-management-from-voting-through
-reporting.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing ProxyEdge).
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Importantly, these institution-directed services allow their
subscribers to provide standing voting instructions or SVI.
Standing voting instructions are voting guidelines or policies
provided by an investor to an intermediary in advance of a specific shareholder meeting, directing how the investor’s shares
are to be voted. The intermediary then applies these instructions
to each shareholder meeting, and casts the client’s vote in accordance with those instructions, unless the client directs otherwise.71 SVI enable investors to coordinate votes for all the securities in their portfolios on a single platform, making them a
critical component of an efficient voting process for institutional
investors that may hold positions in thousands of portfolio companies. 72 As of 2014, for example, more than half of institutional
users of ProxyEdge used some form of SVI. 73
Retail investors do not have access to an analogous mechanism for voting their shares. The vast majority of retail investors
hold their securities in street name, meaning that the investor,
known as a beneficial owner, holds his or her securities through
an intermediary—typically a bank or broker—known as a nominee or record holder. 74 Street name ownership means that the
beneficial owner is not listed on the issuer’s share registry as the
holder of record. To protect the voting rights of beneficial owners,
SEC rules require that the nominee holder forward proxy materials to the beneficial owner and obtain instructions from the
beneficial owner as to how to vote the shares.75
71. See Letter from Glass Lewis to Mary Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-100
.pdf (describing process of voting subscribers’ shares according to subscribers’
custom voting policies).
72. See, e.g., HEXAM Capital Partners, Proxy Voting Philosophy and Procedures, COPPIN COLLINGS app. 1 (Jan. 2016), http://coppincollings.com/pdf/
Proxy%20Voting%20-%20Version%207%20-%20January%202016.pdf (describing ProxyEdge and how its “quick vote tool allows you to vote the same way
across all proposals with one click”).
73. Presentation, Broadridge, Status Update on Initiatives to Increase Retail Voting Participation 12 (Aug. 8, 2014) (on file with author).
74. Many institutional investors hold their securities in street name as
well. As of 2007, approximately eighty-five percent of exchange-traded securities were held through nominees. Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 23, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm.
75. See Keir D. Gumbs, Todd Hamblet & Kristin Stortini, Debunking the
Myths Behind Voting Instruction Forms and Vote Reporting, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 1 (2013), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/
publications/2013/07/corp_gov_advisor_article-voting_instruction_forms_and_
vif_reporting.pdf (describing the SEC and NYSE rules protecting the voting
rights of beneficial owners). The regulations require the soliciting party to bear
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Retail investors must submit separate voting instructions
for every shareholder meeting at each company in which they
own stock. Platforms that consolidate the voting procedure, such
as those offered to institutional investors, are neither open to nor
cost-effective for retail investors. Although retail investors can
use the Internet to submit their voting instructions, the mechanism for doing so, proxyvote.com, has been described as “inefficient and clunky.” 76 Until recently, retail investors were required to access proxyvote.com separately for each meeting by
manually keying in a control number.77 Although Broadridge
has improved proxyvote.com, incorporating some information
from an investor’s past votes and, in some cases, allowing direct
links from e-delivery, the functionality is far more limited than
that available to institutional investors. 78
Perhaps the most important difference is the inability of retail investors to submit SVI. Unlike institutions, retail investors
cannot designate a set of voting preferences in advance, save
their prior voting preferences, or designate a set of guidelines
that will be applied automatically. As a result, investors must
enter their voting instructions separately for each issuer, each
issue and each annual meeting. In addition, proxyvote.com is
purely a voting platform; it does not provide investors with information about the issues on which they are voting. Indeed,
proxyvote.com is not fully integrated even with the federally
mandated disclosure; access to that information via the
proxyvote.com website requires a series of cumbersome clickthroughs to material stored on other websites.
The SEC has not ignored developments in Internet technology. Indeed, in 2007, the SEC embraced the Internet by revising
the costs of transmitting proxy materials under Regulation 14A. The NYSE sets
the maximum fee that brokers can charge an issuer for the transmission of
proxy materials. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Amending NYSE Rules 451 and 465 and the Related
Provisions of Section 402.10 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (Oct. 18,
2013) [hereinafter Rulemaking Order], https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/
2013/34-70720.pdf (adopting changes to NYSE proxy fee structure).
76. Letter from Moxy Vote to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 6 (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2012/petn4-651
.pdf.
77. Id.
78. The differences stem from a variety of reasons including cost, regulatory barriers, and the fact that retail investors do not subscribe to the advisory
services whose recommendations are integrated into the institutional voting
sites. See also infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory barriers).
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the proxy solicitation rules to eliminate the requirement that issuers provide investors with a full copy of the mandated disclosures. 79 This rule change, known as e-proxy, substituted notice
and access for full distribution, enabling issuers to satisfy the
disclosure requirements by posting proxy materials on their
website and providing investors with a notice of the posting.80 Eproxy enhances efficiency, in that it allows issuers to avoid the
high cost of printing and mailing proxy materials to all their
shareholders. 81 At the same time, however, electronic delivery
may reduce the visibility of voting issues.82 Some statistics suggest that e-proxy has contributed to lower retail voter turnout. 83
The reasons for this effect are unclear, 84 but replacing the written proxy statement with just a notice may reduce the salience
79. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29,
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249, and 274); Shareholder Choice
Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,222 (Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of
Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9108 (Feb. 22, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9108.pdf.
80. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,222
(Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Investors are entitled to receive a paper copy of the full proxy material, at no cost, on request. Id. at 42,224.
81. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing
Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 475 (2008) (arguing that e-proxy offers a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the traditional proxy contest).
82. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Official Calls for Review of Electronic Proxy
Delivery Rules, REUTERS, (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec
-proxy-idUSKBN0LN24D20150219 (stating that such rules likely have depressed retail investor participation in elections).
83. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 23 (arguing that e-proxy may have contributed to the turnout of only 4% percent of Apple’s retail shareholders at the 2008
annual meeting); FABIO SACCONE, CONFERENCE BOARD, E-PROXY REFORM, ACTIVISM, AND THE DECLINE IN RETAIL SHAREHOLDER VOTING 4 (Dec. 2010),
http://shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101200_ConferenceBoard
.pdf (citing a speech by SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins) (reporting retail vote
of 16.4% for issuers that did not deliver paper proxy materials); Aguilar, supra
note 38 (“[R]etail response rates have declined each year since the introduction
of the notice and access model.”); Lynch, supra note 82 (quoting statement by
Robert Schifellite, an executive with Broadridge Financial Solutions, that “retail investors vote 41 percent of the shares when they receive the full mailed
packet, versus 23 percent when notified by e-mail, and a mere 18 percent when
notified about voting by mail”).
84. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rules Requiring Internet Availability of
Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9073, at 7 (Oct. 14, 2009), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9073.pdf (describing lower voting turnout
after adoption of e-proxy but noting that “[t]he available data do not necessarily
exclude the possibility that factors other than requirements of our notice and
access rules may contribute to the different voting response rates, although the
available data do not identify them”).
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of the issues on which shareholders are going to be asked to
vote. 85 In addition, shareholders who receive only a notice of the
annual meeting may be unwilling to make the additional effort
to obtain a full set of the proxy materials.86
No regulation requires retail investors to vote their stock, 87
and the multi-step aspect of e-proxy coupled with the rational
apathy of small investors, traditionally, led relatively few retail
investors to submit voting instructions. 88 For many years, the
effect of low retail voter turnout was masked, however, by discretionary broker voting.89 NYSE rules in effect since 1937, and
NYSE Rule 452 in particular, granted brokers discretionary voting authority with respect to routine matters. 90 Rule 452, known
as the ten-day rule, provided that if the beneficial owner did not
provide voting instructions at least ten days before the shareholders meeting, the broker was free to vote those uninstructed
shares as he or she saw fit. 91
85. Alternatively, the delivery of the notice may have created confusion
among investors as to how to cast their vote. See id. at 8 (describing this possibility).
86. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (observing substantially lower voting rate by shareholders that received notice only, as opposed to those that received delivery of a
full set of proxy materials).
87. Noam Noked, The Promise of the Enhanced Broker Internet Platform,
HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. & FIN. REG. (Sept. 22, 2013), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/22/the-promise-of-the-enhanced-broker
-internet-platform.
88. See JEFFREY T. HARTLIN & PAUL HASTINGS: STAY CURRENT, THE SEC
APPROVES THE ELIMINATION OF BROKER DISCRETIONARY VOTING IN ALL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 3 (Aug. 2009), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default
-source/PDFs/1385.pdf (reporting that, in 2009, voting instructions were submitted for only 32% of retail shares). “Data from the 2005 proxy season indicates
that the voting rights relating to 56% of accounts with shares held in street
name were not exercised by their beneficial owners. Presumably, many of these
shares were nonetheless voted by brokers.” William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case
Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholders’ Meetings, 74
TENN. L. REV. 199, 220 (2007).
89. Sjostrom, supra note 88, at 220 (“Broker votes of uninstructed shares
typically represent five to ten percent of votes cast at an annual shareholders’
meeting.”).
90. See SEC Publishes for Comment Proposed Amendment to NYSE Rule to
Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting in Uncontested Director Elections, GIBSON DUNN: CLIENT ALERT (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/SECProposedAmendmentToNYSERuletoEliminate
BrokerDiscretionaryVoting.aspx (recounting history of Rule 452).
91. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, at 4 n.12 (July 1, 2009)
[hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215], https://www.sec.gov/rules/
sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. With respect to routine matters, including uncontested elections, if a beneficial owner does not provide instructions at least ten
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In 2004, the Business Roundtable submitted a petition requesting the SEC to revise its proxy rules. 92 The Business
Roundtable observed that various aspects of the proxy rules had
become outdated and that technological innovations warranted
the implementation of a better system of communicating with
shareholders. 93 Among the proposals was a request that the SEC
eliminate the circuitous process that required beneficial owners
to use their broker as an intermediary in the voting process. 94
The Business Roundtable suggested replacing the existing voting process with one that would enable beneficial owners to vote
their shares directly. 95 The petition also noted that various developments were leading to the erosion of the ten-day rule and
that a number of commentators had proposed that the rule be
eliminated as obsolete. 96 The Business Roundtable argued that
this provided additional reason to facilitate direct investor voting. 97
The Business Roundtable’s predictions regarding the tenday rule were accurate. Over the course of the next several years,
the NYSE gradually began to cut back on the scope of the tenday rule. The regulatory changes limited the scope of discretionary voting authority by classifying an increasing number of voting issues as non-routine. 98 As the Business Roundtable’s petition had noted, in 2003, the NYSE had already classified
days before the meeting, the broker is free to, and typically does, vote these
uninstructed shares as it chooses. Sjostrom, supra note 88, at 220.
92. See Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Shareholder Communications,
Business Roundtable [hereinafter Rulemaking Petition], http://www
.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/BRT%20Petition%204-16-08_0.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. at 2. John Wilcox submitted a comment letter earlier, in 2003, making a similar recommendation. See Letter from John C. Wilcox, Vice Chairman,
Georgeson S’holder Commc’ns, Inc., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC File No.
S7-19-03 (Dec. 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/georgeson
121203.htm.
96. Rulemaking Petition, supra note 92, at 8.
97. Id.
98. In 2005, the NYSE created its Proxy Working Group for the purpose of
reviewing the NYSE’s rules concerning proxy voting with a particular focus on
Rule 452. See Proxy Working Group, NYSE, Inc., Report and Recommendations
of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange, at 1 (June 5,
2006), http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%20
Proxy%20Working%20Grp%20Rpt%206-5-2006.pdf. At that time, NYSE Rule
452 classified eighteen items as non-routine, but including uncontested director
elections, among other items, as routine. Id. The Working Group recommended
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shareholder approval of equity compensation plans as a non-routine matter for which discretionary broker voting was not permitted. 99
Similarly, in 2009, the SEC approved the NYSE’s request to
amend Rule 452 to eliminate discretionary voting in uncontested
director elections. 100 Subsequently, the NYSE extended the ban
to the shareholder vote mandated by Dodd-Frank in connection
with executive compensation. On January 25, 2012, the NYSE
amended the rules to prohibit discretionary voting on corporate
governance issues such as charter and bylaw amendments. 101
Today, brokers are prohibited from exercising discretionary
voting authority with respect to most issues on which shareholders are asked to vote. 102 Instead, nominee holders such as banks
and brokers are supposed to obtain voting instructions from the
beneficial owners of the securities and to vote the shares in accordance with those instructions. 103 Rule 14b-1(d) requires brokers to solicit voting instructions, but it does not specify the form
that the broker’s request must take. 104 Unlike Rule 14a-4 which
contains explicit specifications for the required form of proxy, 105
there is no similar requirement for the voter information form
(VIF), or a mandate that it contain identical language to that on
the formal proxy. 106 Instead, the regulations leave the procedure
that the rule be changed to classify uncontested director elections as non-routine. Id. at 4. The NYSE subsequently sought SEC approval to amend Rule 452.
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 1.
99. Exchange Act Release No. 34-48108, supra note 14.
100. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91. Notably, the
rule change retained the broker-vote at open-end investment companies (mutual funds) because mutual funds are largely retail held, and since retail investors are less likely to vote, it is costly for funds to solicit votes. Id. at 15–17.
101. NYSE, Inc., Information Memo No. 12-4, “Application of Rule 452 to
Certain Types of Corporate Governance Proxy Proposals” (Jan. 25, 2012).
102. Leigh P. Ryan, Michael L. Zuppone & Rebecca A. Brophy, NYSE Implements New Restrictions on Broker Discretionary Voting, PAUL HASTINGS: CLIENT ALERT, at 1 (Mar. 2012). The primary issue that remains classified as routine is the ratification of the firm’s auditors. See id. at 2 (“The NYSE has
specifically noted that the ratification of independent auditors continues to be a
routine or ‘Broker May Vote’ matter . . . .”).
103. Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2017) regulates the process of disclosing proxy materials to beneficial owners and soliciting voting instructions.
See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 3462495, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,984–85 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Proxy
Plumbing Release] (describing this process).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1.
105. Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 4.
106. See James McRitchie, SEC’s IAC Seeks Input for Agenda, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVIST, http://www.theshareholderactivist.com/shareholder-policies
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for obtaining voting instructions to the discretion of the record
holder.107
Although the existing rules require brokers to establish a
website at which investors can access the request for voting instructions, the existing rules do not require the website even to
provide investors with access to the proxy statement and other
soliciting materials. 108 In addition, the rule only obligates a broker to solicit voting instructions once it has received proxy materials from a soliciting party. 109
In practice, most nominee holders outsource the transmission of proxy materials and the solicitation of voting instructions
to a private service provider—Broadridge. 110 Broadridge provides investor communications technology supporting the proxy
voting process for more than 90% of public companies in North
America.111 Issuers, rather than nominees or record holders,
bear the cost of compliance with Regulation 14A and are required to reimburse brokers for the costs of compliance under a
fee schedule set by the NYSE.112

-investor-regulations/secs-iac-seeks-input-for-agenda (last visited Oct. 18, 2017)
(describing differences in the language of a shareholder proposal and the language that appeared on Broadridge’s VIF ).
107. Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 6 n.22. See also Amendments to Rules
Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 79, at 11 (observing that the notice required under e-proxy does not have to conform to Rule 14a4 or “directly mirror the proxy card”).
108. See Rule 14b-1(d)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2017) (noting that the provision of such access is “at the broker or dealer ’s option”).
109. Id.
110. See Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, supra note 74 (“Most broker-dealers outsource proxy processing functions, including forwarding proxy
materials to beneficial owners and collecting voting information from beneficial
owners for forwarding to the issuer.”); Recommendations of the Investor Advisory Committee: Impartiality in the Disclosure of Preliminary Voting Results,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, at 2 (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
investor-advisory-committee-2012/impartiality-disclosure-prelim-voting-results.pdf (“[B]rokers almost universally contract out the tasks to a single intermediary, Broadridge.”).
111. FORTUNE Magazine Names Broadridge One of the “World’s Most Admired Companies,” BROADRIDGE, (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.broadridge.com/
press-release/2016/broadridge-named-one-of-the-worlds-most-admired
-companies.
112. Broadridge bills issuers directly for this service pursuant to a fee schedule established by the NYSE and Nasdaq. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note
103, at 56.
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B. INITIATIVES TO FACILITATE RETAIL INVESTOR VOTING
From the time that the NYSE Proxy Working Group first
began to consider limiting the scope of discretionary broker voting, commentators recognized that the contemplated regulatory
changes would dramatically reduce the percentage of retail
shares voted because very few retail shareholders submit voting
instructions. 113 At that time, the Working Group made several
recommendations aimed at increasing retail voting, including increasing efforts to educate investors about the proxy voting system and supporting issuer efforts to communicate with beneficial owners.114 In its subsequent addendum, which focused on
the difficulty for issuers of obtaining a quorum in the absence of
broker voting, the Working Group identified proportional voting
and client-directed voting as possible solutions. 115
SVI was suggested by Steve Norman, who was a member of
the Working Group and the Corporate Secretary of American Express.116 Norman suggested that investors be permitted to submit a good-until-cancelled instruction as part of their brokerage
agreement which would allow the designation of one of four voting positions for all securities held in the investor’s account: (1)
follow the board’s recommendation; (2) vote against the board’s
recommendation; (3) abstain; (4) vote proportionally with the retail votes for which the broker has received voting instructions. 117 Norman contemplated that the instructions would operate as a default in the event that the investor did not submit
specific voting instructions for a particular shareholder meeting. 118 The proposal contemplated that these instructions could
always be revoked by the investor, either generally or with respect to a specific meeting. 119
The Working Group debated the merits of Norman’s proposal but did not reach a conclusion. 120 Although members of the
group recognized various advantages to the proposal, they also
identified a number of concerns.121 Arguably the most serious
113. Id. at 88–89.
114. Id. at 4–5.
115. ADDENDUM, supra note 41, at 3–5. Proportional voting would have
given brokers the discretion to vote shares for which they did not receive voting
instructions in the same proportion as instructed shares. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4–6.
121. Id. at 5.
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was the risk of uninformed voting. 122 As the addendum explained, “it was noted that the [client-directed voting (CDV)] proposal could make it easy for investors (particularly retail investors) to disengage from the proxy process, and essentially make
important voting decisions in advance without full information
about the matters to be voted upon.” 123
In 2007, the SEC held a roundtable on broker voting. 124 In
its public statement concerning the roundtable, the SEC noted
the Proxy Working Group’s identification of CDV as a possible
alternative to discretionary broker voting. 125 The SEC noted,
however, that “[c]lient-directed voting may raise concerns because the client (beneficial owner) is being asked to make a voting decision prior to receiving any proxy materials.” 126
Commentators on the SEC’s 2009 rulemaking also suggested that the SEC make the necessary rule changes to permit
either CDV or SVI. 127 The SEC declined to do so, observing in its
subsequent release approving the NYSE rule change that “[w]ith
respect to client directed voting, the Commission notes that it
raises a variety of questions and concerns, such as requiring
shareholders to make a voting determination in advance of receiving a proxy statement with the disclosures mandated under
the federal securities laws and without consideration of the issues to be voted upon.” 128
The SEC continued to consider whether to adopt changes to
the proxy rules to permit SVI. In July 2010, the SEC issued the
“Proxy Plumbing Release.” 129 The Proxy Plumbing Release
sought input on a broad variety of issues related to proxy voting
in an effort to identify mechanisms for improving the current
system.130
Among the topics addressed by the release was SVI.131 The
SEC acknowledged that the low level of voting by retail investors
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, supra note 74.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 34 (noting
SEC approval of amendments to NYSE Rule 452).
128. Id.
129. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note 103.
130. See id. at 10 (“[W]e remain interested in ways to improve our proxy
disclosure, solicitation, and distribution rules.”).
131. Id. at 81–86. The SEC noted the existing proxy rules would not permit
brokers to solicit SVI from their customers. See id. at 84 (“There is currently no
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was “a source of concern,” 132 and that commentators had proposed SVI as a tool to increase retail investor participation in
voting.133 The SEC observed, however, that SVI raised “a variety
of questions and concerns.” 134 It noted that an SVI system would
require “investors to make a voting decision in advance of receiving a proxy statement containing the disclosures mandated under the federal securities laws and possibly without consideration of the specific issues to be voted upon.” 135 It also warned that
the availability of SVI might serve as a disincentive for investors
to read the proxy statement. 136
Part of the Proxy Plumbing Release solicited comments on
whether the SEC should adopt regulatory changes to permit retail investors to submit SVI.137 The SEC also solicited comments
on a related proposal—the development of an enhanced broker
internet platform (EBIP), which would enable investors to receive proxy information and submit voting instructions through
their brokerage account website. 138 As with SVI, an EBIP would
provide retail investors with functionality currently only available to institutional investors. It would also create a mechanism
for investors to submit or modify their SVI through their brokerage accounts.
The Proxy Plumbing Release did not lead the SEC to adopt
reforms to the proxy voting process. The SEC revisited the possible need for reforms in its 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable. 139
Again, the subject of SVI was raised.140 Several roundtable participants noted that commentators had proposed various forms
of SVI for a number of years.141 At the Roundtable, Alan Beller

applicable exemption for securities intermediaries to solicit advance voting instructions from their customers.”).
132. Id. at 78.
133. Id. at 81–84.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1–2. The SEC specifically observed that such reforms would enable retail investors access to a service that is presently available to institutional
investors. Id. at 84.
138. Id. at 80–81.
139. Proxy Voting Roundtable, U.S. SEC. EXCH. & COMM’N, https://www.sec
.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). For an
unofficial transcript of the roundtable, see 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra
note 26.
140. 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 26, at 133, 138–41.
141. Id.
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observed that the potential disadvantages of SVI could be crystalized into a single essential concern—that permitting SVI
would increase the potential for uninformed voting. 142 By definition, investors who submit SVI would be making their voting decisions in advance of, and without access to, the federally-mandated disclosures contained in the proxy statement. Arguably,
then, SVI can be viewed as in tension with the disclosure-based
approach to investor protection that animates federal securities
regulation. Put more strongly, federally-mandated disclosure
would potentially be irrelevant to shareholders who do not use
that information to decide how to vote.
Despite the absence of regulatory changes, private market
providers have attempted to respond to the concerns identified
in the Proxy Plumbing Release and the 2015 Roundtable by developing mechanisms to facilitate retail investor voting. These
experiments have had limited success, due in part to regulatory
impediments.143 Perhaps the best known effort was Moxy Vote,
an internet-based platform created by a private investment firm
that was designed to allow retail investors both to cast their
votes, and to view information from institutional investors such
as hedge funds. 144 The site simplified the mechanics of the voting
process by allowing shareholders to mirror other shareholders’
votes or to cast their votes in accordance with particular advocacy positions or predetermined voting policies. 145 For shareholders to use Moxy Vote, however, their brokers had to forward
voting authority to Moxy Vote, and some brokers were unwilling
to do so.146
142. For comments of Alan Beller, see id. at 129.
143. See Robin Miller, Shareholder Advocacy in Corporate Elections: Case
Studies in Proxy Voting Websites for Retail Investors, CLARK U. INT’L DEV., COMMUNITY & ENV’T, Paper 52, at 5 (May 1, 2016) (“[O]f the several websites that
were created in the United States [to facilitate retail investor voting] including
Moxy Vote, Sharegate.com, Shareowners.org, United States Proxy Exchange
and ProxyDemocracy.org, all but one site have effectively ceased operations.”).
144. Joseph N. DiStefano, West Chester ’s Moxy Vote Boosts Rebel Shareholders, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 20, 2009), http://philly.com/philly/blogs/inq
-phillydeals/West_Chesters_MoxyVote_boosts_rebel_shareholder_voices_.html
(Moxy Vote was started as a for-profit market intermediary with seed funding
from an investment partnership, and at the time of its creation, it was unclear
whether the site could be funded through advertising subscriptions or fees).
145. See generally Letter from Larry Eiben to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2012/
petn4-651.pdf (describing Moxy Vote).
146. McRitchie, supra note 7 (“Some brokers were refusing to deliver to the
now defunct Moxy Vote CDV system.”).
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Moxy Vote ceased operations in 2012, due to a combination
of regulatory hurdles and the reluctance of custodial brokers to
allow their customers to vote through the site.147 At that time,
Moxy Vote petitioned the SEC for a rulemaking to permit a “neutral Internet voting platform” that would enable retail investors
to designate a neutral internet site for delivery of proxy information, storing voting preferences, and executing shareholder
votes. 148 To date, the SEC has not enacted such a rule.149
Although Moxy Vote’s effort to combine internet proxy voting with information relevant to the voting decision was not successful, other market participants have continued to innovate.
Broadridge, for example, has continued to develop and expand
technological tools for retail investor voting. Broadridge’s innovations offered retail investors the first modern alternatives to
submitting their voting instructions by mail—initially enabling
telephonic submission and then electronic submissions through
proxyvote.com. Of the retail shares that are currently voted,
more than two-thirds are voted through proxyvote.com. 150
Broadridge has innovated with respect to proxyvote.com as
well. For example, Broadridge developed a one-click button to
allow investors to vote in accordance with the board’s recommendations on all issues, rather than providing instructions separately for each issue on the proxy card.151 Critics objected to the
button, however, because Broadridge did not offer a similar

147. Richard Finger, Shareholders, Shake Off Your Apathy and Vote to Stop
Tom Ward and Michael Dell, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/richardfinger/2013/02/21/shareholders-shake-off-your-apathy-and-vote-to
-stop-tom-ward-and-michael-dell-from-screwing-you; see also Jeff Blumenthal,
Done In By Regulatory Stumbling Blocks, Moxy Vote Says, PHILA. BUS. J. (July
20, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/print-edition/2012/07/20/
done-in-by-regulatory-stumbling.html (“Individual shareholders have no legal
grounds to compel their brokers to deliver ballots electronically to Internet voting platforms. Many brokerages told Moxy Vote that they would send them only
when required to do so by regulators.”).
148. See Eiben, supra note 145.
149. See James McRitchie, The False Promise of the Enhanced Broker Internet Platform, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.corpgov.net/
2013/09/the-false-promise-of-the-enhanced-broker-internet-platform (advocating for a similar but broader proposal for an “open CDV” that would allow anyone to create a voting feed and enable retail shareholders to choose a feed as the
basis for their proxy votes).
150. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 8, at 2.
151. Ross Kerber, Proxy Sites Dump One-Click Vote Button on SEC Concerns, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/proxy-voting
-website-idUSL1N0C5D3M20130320.
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mechanism for investors to vote against all the board recommendations, creating an uneven playing field. 152 Broadridge subsequently removed the button. 153 Broadridge has also added features to the site, such as enabling an investor to cast votes for
pending shareholders meetings at more than one issuer after entering a single control number, so long as the shares are held in
the same account.
Although Broadridge has continued to develop
proxyvote.com to simplify the mechanics of the voting process, 154
the challenge is that brokers are not currently required to connect the platform to retail investors’ brokerage accounts. As a
result, many investors must use proxyvote.com to submit voting
instructions to their brokers. 155 Retail investors could engage in
internet voting more efficiently if they had access to a single platform to manage their account—a platform that would include securities positions, notice of upcoming shareholder meetings, access to proxy information, and the ability to cast the investor’s
vote. In addition, proxyvote.com does not offer investors the ability to submit SVI and does not include additional information
that might assist shareholders in making their decisions, such
as the recommendations of proxy advisors or information on how
other large investors are voting.
Importantly, brokers—who indirectly control retail voting
through the voting mechanisms that they provide to their customers—have limited incentives to provide their customers with
more efficient voting procedures. Brokers do not bear the cost of
soliciting voting instructions; Regulation 14A requires issuers to
compensate nominee holders for the costs of forwarding proxy
material and collecting voting instructions. The NYSE oversees
this system by setting the rules concerning the fees that issuers
152. See, e.g., James McRitchie, ProxyVote.com Encourages Zombie Voting,
CORP. GOVERNANCE (MAY 31, 2012), https://www.corpgov.net/2012/05/
proxyvote-com-encourages-zombie-voting (“ The vote with management button
results in zombie voting.”).
153. See Gumbs et al., supra note 75, at 4 (arguing that the button might
have seemed to be in tension with Rule 14a-4, which requires that shareholders
be given the opportunity to vote individually on each matter under consideration, although shareholders would obviously not have been required to use the
button if they wanted to vote separately on each matter).
154. See, e.g., Broadridge Introduces the First Mobile ProxyVote Platform
Shareholders Can Now Vote on Smartphones and Other Mobile Devices,
BROADRIDGE (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.broadridge.com/news-events/press
-releases/Broadridge-Introduces-the-First-Mobile-ProxyVote-Platform.html
(describing Broadridge’s expansion of proxyvote.com to mobile devices).
155. Proxy Plumbing Release, supra note 103, at 80.
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must pay to broker-dealers for this process. 156 The system does
not, however, create any financial incentive for brokers to seek
out retail votes or to make the voting process easier for their customers. As a result, in 2010, the NYSE created the Proxy Fee
Advisory Committee (PFAC) to review the existing fee structure
and make recommendations. 157 Among the PFAC’s objectives
was to “encourage and facilitate active voting participation by
retail street-name shareholders.” 158
In its comments on the SEC’s Proxy Plumbing release,
Broadridge suggested to the PFAC that it could further this objective through the use of EBIPs, also known as investor mailboxes.159 Like Moxy Vote, EBIPs centralize the mechanics of
proxy voting for retail shareholders by allowing them to vote
their proxies on their broker’s website, as well as providing them
with consolidated access to proxy materials and other information. Although Broadridge was not successful in persuading
the SEC to adopt EBIPs through rulemaking, 160 it argued to the
PFAC that brokers could be encouraged to cooperate with
Broadridge to implement EBIPs if they were compensated
through an incentive fee. 161
The NYSE agreed and, in 2013, amended its rules to establish an incentive fee program designed to encourage brokers to
develop and encourage the use of EBIPs. 162 Since 2013,
Broadridge has developed an investor mailbox that can be directly integrated into the broker’s website, allowing the broker’s
customers to submit voting instructions directly through that
156. See RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY FEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 2–3 (May 16, 2012), http://www
.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%20PFAC%20Report%20
5-16-2012.pdf [hereinafter Recommendations of the Proxy Fee Advisory Committee] (explaining that “in 2012, issuers paid approximately $200 million in
aggregate on fees for proxy distribution to street name shareholders during a
year ”).
157. See id. at 1, 6–7 (describing the formation and composition of the
PFAC).
158. Id. at 9.
159. Rulemaking Order, supra note 75, at 24.
160. Noked, supra note 87.
161. See Recommendations of the Proxy Fee Advisory Committee, supra note
156, at 23 (describing Broadridge’s argument).
162. Rulemaking Order, supra note 75, at 55. The rules permit brokers to
charge issuers a one-time $0.99 fee per account for establishing an EBIP,
through which they provide investors with notice of upcoming meetings and a
mechanism for submitting voting instructions through the broker ’s website—
this incentive fee is in effect for a test period that ends December 31, 2018. Id.
THE
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website. 163 The incentive fee has increased broker use of EBIPs,
but progress has been limited, in large part because broker participation remains voluntary. The limited progress has led some
commentators to criticize the SEC for failing to mandate broker
cooperation in the development of EBIPs. 164 As of September
2016, brokers that provide their customers with access to EBIPs
handle 58% of all street positions. 165 In addition, the functionality of EBIPs is limited by existing proxy solicitation rules, as will
be discussed in the next Part.
Another market participant is ProxyDemocracy.org.
ProxyDemocracy provides retail investors with information, in a
searchable format, about pending voting issues, as well as how
major mutual funds and other institutional investors are voting
on those issues.166 Although this information is useful, it is not
linked to a voting platform for retail shareholders. Accordingly,
investors using proxyvote.com must shift to ProxyDemocracy for
each shareholder meeting at which they want to vote. 167 In addition, ProxyDemocracy does not provide investors with a mechanism by which they can automatically cast their votes in the
same way that a designated institutional shareholder is voting,
and the website is limited to information from ten institutional
investors. 168
Private market voting platforms are not the only possible
tool for increasing retail investor voting. An alternative approach would rely on individual issuers to provide investors with
rewards or incentives for voting their shares. In 2010, Prudential
demonstrated the potential value of this approach when it created an innovative vote incentive program. The program offered
163. See Product Insights, Mailbox for Investors Product Demo,
BROADRIDGE, http://broadridge.com/product-insight/mailbox-product-demo
.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (providing an investor mailbox demo video).
164. See Noked, supra note 87 (“Unfortunately, EBIPs are currently the caboose on a stalled train: a rulemaking to change the structure of proxy fees
which has been years in the making and is now languishing at the Commission.”); see also Letter from Charles E. Schumer, Senator, to Mary Jo White,
Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, at 2 (May 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/sr-nyse-2013-07/nyse201307-32.pdf (“[U]rg[ing] the Commission to
move forward expeditiously with the Investor Mailbox (or EBIP) proposal . . . .”).
165. E-mail from Chuck Callan, Senior Vice President, Broadridge, to author
(Oct. 5, 2016, 3:06 PM CST) (on file with author).
166. PROXYDEMOCRACY, http://www.proxydemocracy.org (last visited Oct.
18, 2017).
167. See Advance Disclosers, PROXYDEMOCRACY, http://proxydemocracy.org/
about/vote_sources (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing identities of advance
disclosers).
168. PROXYDEMOCRACY, supra note 166.
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investors who voted their shares the choice of having a tree
planted or receiving an eco-friendly tote bag. 169 Prudential’s program appears to have been successful in increasing voting by
shareholders who had not previously voted, and other companies
might be able to increase retail voting by adopting similar programs.170 Prudential is somewhat unique, however, in that it did
not have to rely as heavily as most companies on the cooperation
of broker intermediaries because it has a substantial number of
retail shareholders who are holders of record. 171 Most companies
in which retail shareholders hold through intermediaries would
find implementing a voting incentive program to be more
costly.172
In a recent paper Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili propose a
somewhat different approach to increasing retail voting—a
nudge.173 Structured after Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s
well known book, 174 the proposal would offer investors “highly
visible voting default arrangements that would . . . allow (or
force) them to choose from a menu of voting short-cuts.” 175 The
idea behind the nudge is to enable investors to use short-cuts to
streamline the voting process by allowing shareholders to set up
and opt-in to default voting arrangements or preferences, rather
than being forced to specify votes on each individual issue at
each issuer. The proposal strongly resembles the types of voting
arrangements that are currently available to institutional investors.
The nascent market developments suggest that harnessing
technology to make retail voting more efficient offers the greatest promise for increasing retail participation. The model for doing so can be found in the voting platform that market forces
169. See Our Approach to Shareholder Engagement, PRUDENTIAL, http://
corporate.prudential.com/view/page/corp/31846 (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
170. See WILLIAM L. TOLBERT, JR., ELAINE WOLFF & ADAM R. KREIS, JENNER & BLOCK CORP. UPDATE, INCENTIVIZING SHAREHOLDERS TO VOTE—TOTE
BAG ANYONE? 1, 3 (2012), https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/9013/
original/Incentivizing_Shareholders_to_Vote_%E2%80%93_Tote_Bag_Anyone
.pdf (reporting the effect of Prudential’s program but that, as of March 2012, “no
company has yet followed Prudential’s example and adopted such a program”).
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. Kastiel & Nili, supra note 27, at 87–91.
174. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (describing how many
small and seemingly insignificant things can influence, or nudge, human behavior).
175. Kastiel & Nili, supra note 27, at 55.
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currently provide to institutional investors. Although the progress with EBIPs has substantially improved the efficiency of
the retail process, the functionality of EBIPs is limited so long
as they cannot be used to submit SVI. Further, retail investors
have demonstrated their interest in having the ability to submit
SVI. Broadridge conducted two separate online surveys of investor interest in SVI in 2011 and 2014. 176 In their survey responses, investors overwhelming reported that they viewed SVI
as making it easier to vote their shares and that they would be
more likely to vote if this service were available to them. 177
II. SVI AND EXISTING REGULATORY CONSTRAINT
As the preceding Part explains, institutional investors have
access to a variety of services that simplify the mechanics of
proxy voting, including: (1) a centralized Internet platform on
which they can access information relating to voting matters for
their entire portfolio; (2) the ability to cast votes through this
platform; and (3) the ability to designate voting policies or preferences, rather than casting votes on an individual, firm-by-firm
basis. The institutional experience demonstrates that the technological challenges to providing these services are minimal.
Nonetheless, EBIPs—the closest retail analogue—provide only a
subset of these services, and are available only to a fraction of
the retail investor population. Specifically, EBIPs do not offer
retail investors the opportunity to designate their voting preferences in advance or to submit voting guidelines that would apply
across their entire portfolio. SVI provides this functionality.
Market participants are precluded from offering SVI to retail investors because of existing provisions in the SEC’s rules regulating the solicitation of proxies. This Part identifies the existing
regulatory barriers to SVI and explains how they could be eliminated.
Under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the SEC has the authority to regulate the proxy solicitation process.178 The SEC has set out the scope of its regulatory authority
by defining as proxy solicitations all communications to share-

176. See Presentation, Broadridge, Evaluation of Proxyvote.com 29–33 (Jan.
2015) (on file with author).
177. Id.
178. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012).
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holders that are “reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.” 179 The SEC rules
provide that, unless an exemption applies, all proxy soliciting
material must be filed with the SEC. 180 In addition, most proxy
solicitations require that the speaker file a proxy statement and
provide that statement to shareholders. 181
Brokers, as discussed above, 182 are the gatekeepers for retail
voting, both because the provisions of Regulation 14A require
brokers to solicit voting instructions 183 and NYSE rules compensate them for doing so. 184 A broker’s request for voting instructions from its customer is a communication reasonably calculated to result in the procurement of a proxy. The request
therefore falls within the SEC’s definition of a proxy solicitation.185
To enable brokers to solicit voting instructions without fear
of liability, the SEC has created a regulatory exemption for certain communications from a broker to its customers. Under Rule
14a-2(a)(1), brokers can transmit third-party proxy solicitation
material to their customers and request voting instructions so
long as the broker: (1) receives no compensation other than reimbursement of its costs; (2) promptly furnishes all proxy soliciting material; and (3) impartially requests a proxy or voting instructions. 186 The exemption only applies if the broker refrains
from providing its own information or analysis of the matters
upon which the shareholders are being asked to vote. 187 The exemption has the effect of treating the broker’s function as ministerial, rather than a proxy solicitation. Rule 14a-2(a)(1)(ii) limits a broker’s ability to obtain standing voting instructions
because, for the exemption to apply, the broker must “furnish
179. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii) (2017) (defining “solicitation”).
180. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (providing exemptions from the filing and
proxy statement requirements); see also § 240.14a-6 (describing filing requirements).
181. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (describing information that must be furnished to shareholders).
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(d).
184. Processing and Transmission of Proxy Material, New York Stock Exchange Rule 451 (2016), http://wallstreet.cch.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer
.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules.
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii) (defining “solicitation”).
186. Id. § 240.14a-2(a)(1).
187. Id. § 240.14a-2(a)(1)(iii) (stating that solicitations must be “impartial”).
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promptly” proxy materials to the person solicited. 188 By definition, the submission of SVI takes place prior to the filing of proxy
materials, making it impossible for the broker to satisfy this requirement.
The exemption under Rule 14a-2(a)(1) does not extend to a
broker’s own expert analysis, recommendations, or information
on how other shareholders are voting. Brokers are permitted,
under a different exemption, Rule 14a-2(b)(3), to furnish not just
additional information but explicit proxy voting advice to their
clients.189 The exemption for proxy voting advice applies as long
as the broker provides financial advice in the ordinary course of
business, does not receive special compensation for the advice,
discloses any conflicts or relationships, and is not soliciting on
behalf of any participant in the proxy contest.190 Unlike the exemption under Rule 14a-2(a)(1), 191 however, this provision only
exempts the broker from the filing requirements and the obligation to furnish a proxy statement. 192 As a result, a broker who
provides advice pursuant to this exemption faces some regulatory risk; the broker could be liable under Rule 14a-9 for proxy
fraud. 193
Rule 14a-4(d) also limits a broker’s ability to ask for SVI. 194
Rule 14a-4(d) does not permit a proxy to confer voting authority
“with respect to more than one meeting” or for “any annual meeting other than the next annual meeting . . . to be held after the
date on which the proxy statement and form of proxy are first
sent or given to security holders.” 195 An SVI platform would require a change in the rule to allow customers to submit voting
instructions prior to the distribution of the proxy statement. SVI
would also require an amendment to Rule 14a-4(d) to authorize
188. The broker must “[f ]urnish[ ] promptly to the person solicited (or such
person’s household in accordance with § 240.14a-3(e)(1)) a copy of all soliciting
material with respect to the same subject matter or meeting received from all
persons who shall furnish copies thereof for such purpose . . . .” Id. § 240.14a2(a)(1)(ii).
189. Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(3). The rule limits the exemption to those with whom
the broker has a business relationship. Id.
190. Id.
191. Rule 14a-2(a)(1) provides exemptions from §§ 240.14a-3 to -15. Id.
§ 240.14a-2(a)(1).
192. Exemptions under Rule 14a-2(b) are limited to §§ 240.14a-3 to -6 (other
than -6(g) and -6(p)), -8, -10, and -12 to -15. Id. § 240.14a-2(b).
193. Id. § 240.14a-9.
194. Id. § 240.14a-4(d).
195. Id. § 240.14a-4(d)(2)–(3).
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voting instructions that would apply to multiple shareholders’
meetings.
Only very modest changes to these provisions would be required to permit brokers to solicit SVI from their customers. The
SEC would have to broaden the exemption under Rule 14a-2 to
permit brokers to solicit SVI, to enable them to do so in advance
of the distribution of the proxy statement, and to provide information in addition to the materials that are distributed by the
issuer and any other soliciting party. A broader exemption under
Regulation 14A might not be sufficient, however, in that it would
merely allow, but not compel, brokers to accept SVI and, as noted
above, brokers have shown limited interest in facilitating retail
voting in the absence of affirmative regulatory obligations or financial incentives. Consequently, the SEC should go further in
enabling efficient retail investor voting by amending Regulation
14A to require custodial brokers to provide investors with access
to an Internet-voting platform. Specifically, custodial brokers
should be required to provide their retail clients with comparable functionality to that available to institutional investors, including the ability to submit voting instructions through the broker’s website and the ability to provide SVI. 196
Amending Regulation 14A to require an effective internetbased system for retail voting would have several advantages
over the current system. First, it would overcome existing broker
reluctance to establishing EBIPs and provide all investors with
access to voting platforms. Second, requiring that brokers permit
SVI would alleviate potential concerns that brokers may currently face about their liability exposure if they deviate from existing practices.197 Third, by addressing these issues explicitly,

196. Alternatively, the SEC could eliminate the pass-through nature of existing Regulation 14A by requiring intermediaries to execute proxies giving beneficial owners the right to vote their shares directly. This would enable beneficial owners to cast their votes directly or use of an Internet-based intermediary
like Moxy Vote. See Rulemaking Petition, supra note 92, at 14 (“Providing the
right to vote to the beneficial owner would simplify the voting and vote tabulation process, and would enable those companies using Internet voting systems
for record holders to extend that system to all beneficial owners.”). By obligating
brokers to execute such proxies, this regulatory change would enable market
participants to compete over the development of voting platforms in the same
way that market competition has produced multiple options for institutional
investors.
197. Recall that the SEC stated in its Proxy Plumbing Release in 2010 that
the proxy rules do not contain an exemption permitting SVI. Proxy Plumbing
Release, supra note 103, at 84.
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the regulation could include appropriate safeguards to protect
investors. This Article will consider those safeguards in Part IV.
Despite these advantages, and despite the fact that SVI proposals have been before the SEC for more than ten years, the
SEC has failed to make the necessary changes even to permit
SVI, much less to encourage it. The SEC’s failure to act appears
to be based on several concerns. As noted earlier,198 in 2009, the
SEC identified the concern that SVI would enable investors to
make their voting decisions before receiving the federally-mandated proxy disclosures. 199 This, in turn, might lead shareholders to make their voting decisions in a generic fashion, without
reference to the firm-specific context in which those instructions
are being applied. This is likely to lead at least some investors to
rely on rules of thumb or heuristics. Investors using SVI might
also rely to a substantial degree on third-party voting recommendations or policies, especially policies formulated by governance
intermediaries such as proxy advisory firms.
These concerns reflect a common theme—the prospect that
SVI will promote uninformed voting by shareholders. At the
2015 SEC Roundtable, Allan Beller succinctly identified uninformed voting as the key obstacle to the implementation of SVI:
“there is a tension between providing a system that encourages
retail investors to vote and the promotion of informed voting.” 200
In the next Part, this Article challenges the claim that the risk
of uninformed voting is an appropriate basis for failing to implement SVI for retail investors. In Part IV, the Article offers some
preliminary suggestions about the appropriate safeguards for
such implementation.
III. SVI AND UNINFORMED SHAREHOLDER VOTING
This Article argues that the risk of uninformed voting is a
red herring—an insufficient basis for the SEC to continue to
deny retail investors a functional voting platform that includes
the capacity for SVI. The concern about uninformed voting is
misplaced for four reasons. First, uninformed voting by retail investors is unlikely. Second, existing regulations are inconsistent
with the voting rights conferred on investors by state law. Third,
SVI is not in tension with the mandatory disclosure regime provided by federal law. Finally, institutional investors currently
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, supra note 91, at 33,302.
200. 2015 Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 26, at 129.
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have access to SVI, and the differences between retail and institutional investors do not warrant different treatment.
A. RETAIL INVESTORS ARE UNLIKELY TO ENGAGE IN
UNINFORMED VOTING
Uninformed voting is, assuredly, undesirable. If shareholders lack adequate information about the issues on which they
vote, they may make mistakes and be vulnerable to exploitation.
The economic rationale for shareholder voting rights is based on
the theory that, as residual claimants, shareholders have the incentive to make discretionary decisions in a way that will maximize firm value.201 If shareholders do not vote in an informed
manner, they may not maximize firm value through their voting
decisions. This behavior has the potential to impose costs not
only on shareholders, but also on other stakeholders and society
at large.
Berle and Means famously recognized that dispersed public
shareholders faced collective-action costs that limit their ability
to use their voting rights effectively.202 For small investors, it is
rational to be apathetic about voting—the typical retail investor
may lack a sufficient stake to warrant the investment of time
necessary to make a fully-informed decision. Rational apathy is,
of course, not a by-product of SVI. Nonetheless, because SVI
gives shareholders the opportunity to designate their voting
preferences in advance and across all their holdings, its availability could reduce the incentive for shareholders to research a
particular vote at a specific issuer.
There is, nonetheless, a substantial gap between theory and
practice. Simply put, the risk that retail investors will engage in
uninformed voting is overstated. There are several reasons for
this. First, and most importantly, retail investors have skin in
the game. As owners, retail shareholders have a meaningful economic stake in the companies in which they invest. It is far more
likely that shareholders who do not believe themselves to be sufficiently informed will withhold their vote, rather than cast an
uninformed vote that might risk damaging their economic stake.
In contrast, most institutional votes are cast by agents or intermediaries, introducing the potential for conflicts of interest or
other agency costs.203
201. FRANK EASTERBROOK &
OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991).

DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

202. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 47, at 71.
203. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 18, at 865 (identifying the dual set of
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Not only do retail investors have a meaningful economic interest, they acquired that economic interest by making an affirmative decision to purchase their shares. Even if a retail investor’s stake in a voting outcome is relatively small, the
underlying investment is likely to be economically meaningful to
that shareholder. In addition, information acquired by the investor in connection with the trading decision also has the capacity
to inform that investor’s voting decisions. Indeed, although retail investor trading decisions may be less sophisticated, they are
likely to be more information-based than a substantial proportion of institutional decisions that are made on the basis of index
composition, benchmarks, or trading algorithms. 204
Second, the use of SVI is not inconsistent with investor use
of and reliance on federally-mandated disclosures. As discussed
in Part IV, this Article’s proposal for SVI would retain the requirement that brokers send a full set of proxy material to their
SVI clients for each meeting, at the same time they distribute
those proxy materials to their other clients. It would also require
that brokers provide clients with the opportunity to override the
standing instructions at any time and to notify clients of their
right to do so in connection with every shareholder meeting. Accordingly, customers would retain the ability to use the federally-mandated disclosure to change or reaffirm any voting instructions that they had previously submitted.
Third, the proxy statement is not the only relevant source of
information with respect to voting decisions. Shareholders today
have access to substantial and timely information about issuers
and voting issues. As noted above, shareholders have access to
information in connection with their trading decisions and have
some level of familiarity of the issuers at which they are being
asked to cast votes, by virtue of having voluntarily invested in
those companies. Issuer information is available on the Internet
and is disseminated through an increasing number of analysts,
websites, and service providers. Retail investors can access the
voting guidelines of mutual funds and the voting policies of many

agency relationships presented by institutional investor involvement in corporate governance).
204. See Dan Li & Geng Li, Are Household Investors Noise Traders? Evidence
from Belief Dispersion and Stock Trading Volume, 19, 30 (Fed. Reserve Bd.
Working Paper No. 2014-35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2438025 (presenting data that trading by household investors is belief- and
information-based and contributes to market efficiency).
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other institutional investors, and can use that information to formulate their own voting policies.205 Business and financial media provide extensive coverage of shareholder voting issues, and
recent economic studies demonstrate the influence of media coverage on voting outcomes. 206
Finally, increased levels of retail participation in the voting
process will create an incentive for participants in an election to
reach out and communicate with retail investors. Proxy solicitation firms have a variety of tools available to enable issuers and
challengers to communicate their views to a retail-investor base.
The use of such tools is far more likely to generate an informed
vote than the existing system of notifying an investor of the online availability of a complex proxy statement. 207 Today, because
of the low levels of retail voting, participants in the proxy solicitation process have little reason to provide information to retail
investors beyond filing the federally-mandated proxy statement,
a document which, after the adoption of e-proxy, is generally not
even provided to shareholders directly.208 If retail voting is more
efficient, retail investors are more likely to vote their shares,
and, in turn, participants in an election will have greater reasons
to seek to inform those votes.

205. SEC rules require mutual funds to disclose their votes and voting policies publicly. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2017). See, e.g., Vanguard’s Proxy Voting
Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/
voting-guidelines (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (describing Vanguard’s voting policies). DOL Regulations impose similar requirements on public pension funds.
See, e.g., California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Statement of Investment Policy for Global Governance, (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/
docs/forms-publications/global-principles-corporate-governance.pdf (describing
CalPERS voting policy).
206. See, e.g., Reggy Hooghiemstra, Yu Flora Kuang & Bo Qin, Say-on-Pay
Votes: The Role of the Media, 24 EUR. ACCT. REV. 753 (2015) (reporting that
negative media coverage of CEO pay is associated with say-on-pay voting dissent in the UK); Reena Aggarwal, Isil Erel & Laura Starks, Influence of Public
Opinion on Investor Voting and Proxy Advisors 21–22 (Fisher Coll. of Bus.
Working Paper No. 2014-03-12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2447012 (finding that public opinion, as reflected in media
coverage, influences both proxy advisor recommendations and voting outcomes).
207. See A Short-List of Incentives That Might Get More Folks to Vote Their
Proxies, SHAREHOLDER SERVICE OPTIMIZER (2011), https://www
.optimizeronline.com/article/101670/a-short-list-of-incentives-that-might-get
-more-folks-to-vote-their-proxies (discussing how mailing a full package of
proxy materials is more likely to get retail investors to vote).
208. Lynch, supra note 82.
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B. STATE LAW VOTING RIGHTS ARE NOT CONDITIONED ON
INFORMED VOTING
Although federal law regulates the mechanics of shareholder voting, state corporate law is the primary source of shareholders’ substantive voting rights. 209 Indeed, the original rationale for federal proxy regulation was to restore to
shareholders the ability to exercise their state-conferred voting
rights when shareholder dispersion threatened their ability to
do so effectively. 210
State law does not, however, require that shareholders cast
an informed vote. Indeed, state law imposes few restrictions on
the motive or intent underlying the exercise of shareholder voting power. Delaware courts, for example, have explicitly recognized a shareholder’s right to act selfishly in exercising its voting
power.211 Similarly, the courts have explained that shareholders
may validly determine how to vote their shares “by whim or caprice.” 212
Shareholder voting power is not conditioned upon shareholder-specific characteristics, such as a shareholder’s independence, intent, or good faith. 213 Delaware corporate law even
allows shareholders to sell their voting rights to someone else. 214
Shareholders do not act as fiduciaries when they exercise their

209. Federal law has, to some extent, supplemented shareholders’ state law
voting rights. The most obvious example is the federally-mandated advisory
vote on executive compensation. See Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why
Congress Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 752
(2013) (discussing say-on-pay).
210. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 453 (2012) (“The federal proxy rules were designed to
replicate, as nearly as possible, an in-person shareholder meeting.”).
211. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996) (citing DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1996)) (affirming controlling shareholder ’s right to vote
based on own self-interest in a transaction requiring shareholder approval to
sell substantially all of a corporation’s assets).
212. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53
A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“Generally speaking, a shareholder may exercise wide
liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is not objectionable that
his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice, so
long as he violates no duty owed his fellow shareholders.”); accord Bershad v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987).
213. See Fisch, supra note 210, at 455 (“State law does not condition the exercise of voting power on shareholder-specific characteristics.”).
214. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CIV.A. 19513, 2002 WL 549137,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2002) (“Shareholders are free to do whatever they want
with their votes, including selling them to the highest bidder.”).
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voting rights, 215 and they are under no obligation to vote their
shares in the best interests of the corporation.216
Although shareholders have occasionally faced challenges
for acting selfishly when exercising their voting rights, those
cases typically involve controlling shareholders acting on behalf
of the corporation, rather than purely in their capacity as shareholders. 217 Even in those cases, courts have recognized that,
while a controlling shareholder may not use the corporate machinery to gain an advantage at the expense of the minority,
even controlling shareholders may nonetheless act out of selfinterest in both voting and selling their stock.218
Although the failure of state law to oversee the manner in
which shareholders exercise their voting power may seem problematic, it is premised on two considerations—the shareholders’
economic stake, which aligns their voting decisions with the objective of maximizing firm value, and the balance of authority
between boards and shareholders which limits the scope of
shareholder voting power. 219 Shareholder voting is, at best, a
weak tool for constraining board and management power, and
215. See, e.g., Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del.
1977), overruled by Weinburger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (quoting
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2031 (perm. ed., rev. vol 1976)) (“At a stockholders’ meeting,
each stockholder represents himself and his own interests solely and in no sense
acts as a trustee or representative of others . . . .”); see also Bershad, 535 A.2d
at 845 (“Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right to control and vote
their shares in their own interest.”).
216. Concededly, state law recognizes that “[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a decision-making mechanism is the premise that stockholders
with economic ownership are expressing their collective view as to whether a
particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth maximization.” Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 997 A.2d 377 (Del.
2010).
217. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008) (observing that the circumstances in which courts have imposed fiduciary duties on shareholders have
been limited both to controlling shareholders and to cases involving “corporate
‘freeze-outs’ and closely held corporations”).
218. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124 (even a controlling “stockholder in a Delaware
corporation” has the right “to vote [his shares] in his own interest”), rev’d on
other grounds, 457 A.2d 701; Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1380–81 (Del.
1996) (“Stockholders (even a controlling stockholder bloc) may properly vote in
their own economic interest . . . .”).
219. See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 35–36) (on
file with author) (identifying the rationale for limiting shareholder power in favor of director primacy).
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imposing conditions on the exercise of that power is likely to eviscerate its effectiveness. Moreover, questions about the ability of
shareholders to exercise their voting power intelligently are
more properly addressed to the substantive scope of shareholder
voting rights than to the manner in which those rights are exercised.220
C. UNINFORMED SHAREHOLDER ACTION IS NOT IN TENSION
WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
In contrast to state corporate law, the disclosure orientation
of the federal securities laws prioritizes the goal of informed
shareholder action. The very rationale of a mandatory disclosure
system is to protect investors by giving them sufficient information relevant to their trading and voting decisions. 221 Federal
law requires the disclosure of specified information in a variety
of circumstances. Issuers are required to file a registration statement and prospectus prior to selling securities to the public. 222
After going public, issuers are required to make periodic disclosures to keep investors informed, including an annual report. 223
In addition, anyone who solicits proxies from shareholders is required to comply with the proxy-solicitation requirements of
Regulation 14A, which include the preparation of a proxy statement. 224
One objective of this disclosure is to facilitate informed
shareholder action.225 Federal law does not actually require,
however, that shareholders be informed. Rather, the obligation
is on issuers to disclose, not on investors to use that disclosure. 226
The principle behind the federal disclosure system is to require
that the mandated disclosure be sent to each investor, not that
220. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 209, at 753–54 (identifying limitations on
shareholders’ ability to cast an intelligent “say-on-pay” vote).
221. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 431
(2003) (“Disclosure is merely the chosen means to the end of informed investor
decision making.”).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b)(1), (g)(1), m, o(d)
(2012).
224. Id. § 78n(a).
225. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 221, at 462 (“Informed investor decision
making [is] a key goal of the federal securities laws, probably the main goal
today.”).
226. Cf. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000) (proposing instead the elimination
of issuer-based regulatory requirements in favor of investor regulation).
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each investor read it, acknowledge that they have read it, or
demonstrate his or her familiarity with its contents prior to investing or voting.
Moreover, as a practical matter, modern investors are unlikely to read the federally-mandated disclosure documents. The
length and complexity of the proxy statement and supporting
documents continues to increase. For example, Jeffrey Gordon
observed that the average length of an annual report increased
from approximately sixteen pages in 1950 to 165 in 2004. 227 A
similar increase has occurred in the length of proxy statements.228 Not only has the documentation increased in length,
but shareholders are asked to vote on an increasing number of
issues. 229
As a result, many investors never read the federally-mandated disclosures. 230 As Troy Paredes explains, the existing disclosure regime is too extensive and complex, and, as a result,
“few people expect the ‘average’ individual investor to focus in
any detail on the information that companies disclose.” 231 Similarly, a 2006 survey by the Investment Company Institute (ICI)
reported that only one-third of mutual-fund investors consulted
the prospectus before purchasing their shares and that most investors do not use the SEC-mandated disclosure documents to
monitor their investments. 232
The SEC’s concern about SVI reducing shareholder use of
the mandated disclosure is also in tension with other regulatory
reforms that have reduced shareholder access to the disclosures
and made it easier to vote without reading them. As noted above,
for example, the introduction of e-proxy meant that investors
227. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1547 (2007). The average length of an annual report continues to
increase; see also Vipal Monga & Emily Chasan, The 109,894-Word Annual Report, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2015, at B10 (reporting that GE’s 2013 annual report
was 246 pages long and that the average annual report in 2013 was about
42,000 words).
228. See, e.g., Kastiel & Nili, supra note 27, at 69 (citing the example of the
Apple proxy statement, which grew from eighteen pages in 1994 to ninety in
2004).
229. Id. at 68.
230. Cf. Stephen Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 118 (2006) (“Most individual investors
are likely not to read the prospectus even if delivered to them.”).
231. Paredes, supra note 221, at 431–32.
232. See INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 22 (2006), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_
full.pdf.
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must affirmatively seek out the disclosure materials, rather
than receiving them automatically.233 Similarly, the SEC allows
shareholders to submit voting instructions on their mobile devices.234 These actions arguably increase the risk that shareholders will vote without reading the lengthy proxy statement.
This is not to say that the federally-mandated disclosure
system is a failure. The system works because the disclosures
are made to the market, and some market participants incorporate that information into trading prices by relying on that information. This enables the rest of the investing public to freeride—relying on the market price set by better-informed investors. 235 In addition, issuer disclosures are “largely ‘filtered’
through experts—various securities professionals and financial
intermediaries—who research and process the information and
whose trades and recommendations ultimately set securities
prices.” 236 Developments in technology have dramatically increased the market’s ability to process and disseminate information, meaning that the average investor reaps the benefit of
issuer disclosures today through an ever-growing number of Internet and social-media sources.
That federal law expressly vests investors with discretion to
choose which and how much information to use is reflected in the
SEC’s 2005 Public Offering Reforms. 237 In the reforms, the SEC
shifted the disclosure requirement in the registration process
from that of providing investors with disclosure, to instead
providing investors with access—that is, making the disclosure
available. 238 The access-equals-delivery system treats issuers as
having delivered the mandated disclosures to investors once
233. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing e-proxy).
234. See, e.g., Letter from John G. Strumpf, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer,
Wells Fargo & Co., to Stockholders (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www08
.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016
-proxy-statement.pdf (advising shareholders that they can vote their shares using their mobile devices).
235. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014)
(quoting Amgen Inc., v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013))
(“It is reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little
hope of outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis
of publicly available information—will rely on the security’s market price as an
unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”).
236. Paredes, supra note 221, at 431–32.
237. Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731–32 (Aug. 3,
2005).
238. See Choi, supra note 230, at 102–04 (evaluating the effect of shifting
from delivery to access).
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those disclosures are made publicly available. 239 The result of
the system, however, is that investors are left with the choice of
whether to access the applicable disclosure documents, and need
not affirm that they have read them before purchasing securities.
D. ALLOWING SVI FOR INSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT RETAIL
INVESTORS IS NOT WARRANTED
Finally, it is important to recognize that the SEC’s current
regulations have the practical effect of enabling institutional,
but not retail, investors to utilize SVI. The risk of uninformed
voting is not unique to retail investors, however. The same concern might be raised about institutional investor voting.
The regulatory changes adopted by the DOL and the SEC to
mandate institutional voting impose a duty on institutional investors to vote, but institutions do not necessarily cast that vote
in an informed manner. Indeed, commentators frequently criticize institutional investors for “blindly” relying on proxy advisors,240 and policymakers have sought to impose greater regulatory restrictions on advisors with the objective of compelling a
more informed institutional vote.241 The mechanism for doing so
is unclear, however. Many institutions lack the sophistication
and resources to vote in an informed manner. Investment advisors may be expert in designing investment strategies but lack
competence in evaluating governance issues. Some institutions,
such as index funds, compete by minimizing their operating expenses, and devoting substantial resources to governance research may be in tension with that business model. In addition,
institutional investors are subject to agency costs—those who
are making voting decisions do not, as a general rule, have an
economic interest in the securities that they are voting.
239. See Rules 153, 172, 173, 174, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.153, .172, .173, .174
(2017).
240. See, e.g., Daniel Gallagher, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals,
http://sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539700301 (July 11, 2013) (“ The
last thing we should want is for investment advisers to adopt a mindset that
leads to them blindly casting their votes in line with a proxy advisor ’s recommendations, especially given the fact that such recommendations are often not
tailored to a fund’s unique strategy or investment goals.”).
241. See, e.g., Bonnie Barsamian & Marc Leaf, Proxy Advisory Firms in the
Regulatory Spotlight, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/
869646/proxy-advisory-firms-in-the-regulatory-spotlight (discussing proposed
regulation of proxy advisory firms).
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Commentators have suggested that institutional investors
are better positioned to research and develop voting policies than
retail investors, and it is certainly true that some institutional
investors, such as Blackrock and Vanguard, devote substantial
resources to voting research. 242 Both institutional and retail investors vary tremendously, however, and it is likely that a substantial percentage of retail investors who invest directly in common stock are at least as sophisticated as the advisors to many
smaller pension and mutual funds. In short, the difference between retail and institutional investors, with respect to both
their ability and their willingness to make informed voting decisions, is overstated.
Even the claim that retail investors are less sophisticated
than institutions is likely overstated. Wealthy, better-educated,
and more sophisticated households are most likely to invest in
the stock market in general, 243 and, within the overall population of retail investors, are more likely to own stock directly, as
opposed to mutual fund shares. 244 This pattern has increased recently, as unsophisticated households have reduced their investment in equity. 245
It is possible, of course, that the opportunity to submit SVI
will encourage retail investors to be lazy. It is also possible that
institutional investors have structures and internal controls that
enable them to oversee the mechanics of the SVI process more
242. See, e.g., Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street
Bulk up Governance Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a (describing expansions in the
size of corporate governance teams at Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street).
243. Robert Frank, The Stock Gap: American Stock Holdings at 18-year Low,
CNBC (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/08/the-stock-gap-american
-stock-holdings-at-18-year-low.html (“[In] 2010, the latest period available, the
top 10 percent of Americans by net worth held 81 percent of all directly held or
indirectly held stocks.”).
244. See Li, supra note 204, at 24 (“[P]rime-age, better educated, white, and
higher-income consumers should have a more pronounced effect on stock trading volume.”); see also Daniel Barth, The Costs and Beliefs Implied by Direct
Stock Ownership 9 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1657, 2014) (analyzing data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and Household Wealth and
finding that wealthy households are relatively more likely to own individual
stocks, hold an increased number of individual stocks and allocate more of their
household wealth to equity).
245. See, e.g., Marcin Kacperczyk, Jaromir Nosal & Luminita Stevens, Investor Sophistication and Capital Income Inequality 4 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (“Over time, unsophisticated households increase their share of liquid, money-like instruments and shift away from direct
stock ownership and ownership of intermediated products, such as actively
managed equity mutual funds.”).
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effectively and to identify situations in which it is in their interests to override their standing instructions. Even institutions,
however, can make stupid mistakes in casting their votes. Recently, for example, T. Rowe Price failed to override its computerized voting system and mistakenly voted its shares in favor of
the 2013 Dell merger, even though the funds’ advisors believed
the merger price was too low. 246 By voting in favor, the funds
were disqualified from exercising their appraisal rights, an error
that cost them $194 million. 247
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF SVI
Implementation of SVI raises a variety of practical considerations. There is the question of the manner in which brokers
should solicit SVI. Should brokers be required to ask every customer for SVI or is it sufficient if brokers give their customers
the opportunity to do so? Should third party providers be permitted to offer retail investors the opportunity to access internet
sites that enable them to submit SVI? Should brokers be required to cooperate with third-party providers?
A second question concerns the types of instructions that
customers should be permitted to submit. A voting platform
could provide investors with a limited number of choices, such as
the four choices proposed by Steve Norman—voting with the
board recommendation, voting against the board recommendation, voting proportionately with other shareholders, or abstaining. 248 This range of choices would be very simple to implement,
as evidenced by Broadridge’s one-click button. 249
A platform could also provide investors with a broader set of
options, such as, allowing investors to cast their votes in the
same way that another designated investor, in the way a mutual
fund or public pension fund votes its shares. An investor might,
for example, choose to vote their shares in the same way as Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund. This option is similar to the manner
in which institutional investors currently have the ability to direct their votes to be cast in accordance with the recommendations of a proxy advisor, such as ISS or Glass Lewis.
246. Sarah Krouse, T. Rowe Price Pays Up for Botched Vote, WALL ST. J.
(June 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-to-reimburse-clients
-194-million-for-dell-deal-flub-1465244254.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing one-click button).
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Because this approach would result in the investor essentially delegating voting authority to a third party, it raises questions about the extent to which such delegations are appropriate.
Institutional investors have been highly criticized for delegating
their voting decisions to proxy advisory firms. 250 Delegating voting authority, however, raises fewer concerns in the context of
retail investors. First, retail investors who lack the interest or
expertise to analyze voting decisions carefully may rationally
view institutions as more knowledgeable. Second, a retail investor’s decision to delegate voting authority to a large institutional
investor with skin in the game is very different from an institution’s decision to delegate to a proxy advisor who is not subject
to the disciplinary forces of an underlying economic interest. 251
Third, retail investors who delegate voting authority are acting
as principals, rather than fiduciaries, with respect to their voting
decision.
More complex SVI options would allow investors to designate issue-specific voting policies or guidelines, such as voting
against classified boards, in favor of separating the chair and
CEO, or against overboarded directors. The mechanism by which
investors designate such preferences would, of necessity, be
more complex. Nonetheless, the systems available to institutional investors allow these types of designations. An even more
complex menu might enable investors to set up screens which
would operate to direct the investors’ vote in accordance with
specified criteria—such as voting in accordance with management recommendations unless the screen flags a problem like
underperformance or poor corporate governance.
A third question concerns the type of information that
should be available on a voting platform. This Article argues
that, at a minimum, a retail voting platform should enable an
investor to designate SVI for all the investor’s security holdings
and to access the proxy statement, proxy card, and annual re-

250. See Gallagher, supra note 240; see also David Larcker & Allan McCall,
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173,
203 (2015) (“The outsourcing of voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have
the unintended economic consequence that boards of directors are induced to
make choices that decrease shareholder value.”).
251. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law
and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673,
688 (2005) (criticizing the influence of proxy advisors that have no “skin in the
game”).
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port, as well as any other soliciting material, when those documents become available. 252 Platform providers may find, however, that investors want to obtain additional information. Providers could collect and include, as ProxyDemocracy does, the
pre-announced votes of institutional investors. 253 Providers
could include the published voting guidelines of major institutional investors or of the proxy advisory firms. They could also
include links to research concerning corporate governance issues, or media reports concerning specific issuers or voting issues. The broader the scope of this information, the more the
voting platform can serve as a single source for informing investors.
Resolving questions about the best way to implement SVI is
complex. This Article argues, however, that it is neither necessary nor desirable for the SEC to address these questions or to
determine the ideal structure for a retail voting platform. 254 Instead, the Article suggests that existing market forces will enable service providers to experiment with voting platforms, based
on investor demand for these options and the cost of providing
them. Rather than concern itself with identifying an ideal protocol in adopting its regulations, the SEC should limit itself to removing the existing regulatory impediments and implementing
minimal safeguards to prevent abuse. These safeguards should

252. In an ideal world, the voting platform would populate the voting options
with the precise language contained in the proxy, when that language becomes
available.
253. CalPERS publishes its voting decisions in advance of the shareholders’
meeting in an explicit attempt to encourage other shareholders to vote the same
way. See Key Decisions, CALPERS, https://calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/
governance/proxy-voting/key-decisions (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (“We publish
our proxy voting decisions to encourage shareowners to vote in accordance with
CalPERS. These votes are for informational purposes only and not intended as
investment advice.”).
254. Because voting platforms can be implemented in conjunction with brokers’ existing websites, as Broadridge has done with EBPs, it is unnecessary to
impose a separate registration requirement on the voting platform itself. To the
extent that non-brokers seek to establish stand-alone voting platforms, the SEC
may consider whether to require them to register as broker-dealers or investment advisers. It is worth noting that, under current law, proxy advisory firms
do not have to register with the SEC, although legislation has been proposed to
require such registration. See, e.g., Ed Batts, Yet Another Congressional Proposed Corporate Reform: Proxy Advisory Firms in the Crosshairs, HARV. L. SCH.:
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2016/07/20/yet-another-congressional-proposed-corporate-reform
-proxy-advisory-firms-in-the-crosshairs (describing “the Proxy Advisory Reform
Act of 2016”).
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be implemented through regulation of broker-dealers who permit customers to establish SVI and through regulation of intermediaries who provide a proxy-voting platform. 255
With respect to the manner of implementing SVI, SEC regulations should mandate that any communication to a shareholder clearly disclose that the SVI instructions can be revoked
at any time prior to the shareholder meeting, that the SEC has
mandated specific disclosures in connection with a shareholder
vote, and that shareholders should read those disclosures before
deciding whether to adhere to their pre-designated instructions.
Investors who have established SVI should continue to receive
notice of all proxy communications in the same manner as other
shareholders. To facilitate easy access to the SEC-mandated disclosures in connection with the voting decision, the SEC should
require proxy-voting platforms to post or provide links to the disclosures as soon as they are available. 256 In addition, SEC regulations should provide for the proxy voting platform to notify its
customers in advance of the annual meeting of each issuer in
which they own stock. The notice should alert investors about
the upcoming shareholder vote, advise them how their shares
will be voted based on their existing instructions, explain how
they can change that vote if they so desire, and inform investors
of the final deadline for submitting or changing voting instructions with respect to this meeting.
With respect to the SVI options, the SEC’s primary focus
should be to require that they are evenhanded and transparent.
255. This structure is analogous to the regulatory structure established by
Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) with
respect to crowdfunding. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Specifically, the JOBS Act allows
crowdfunded securities to be sold either by a registered broker-dealer or through
a registered crowdfunding portal. See Lori Smith, Bridget Henwood & Michael
Psathas, Regulating the Gatekeepers: The Regulatory Scheme for Funding Portals in Crowdfunding Offerings, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Regulating-the-Gatekeepers-The
-Regulatory-Scheme-for-Funding-Portals-in-Crowdfunding-Offerings.html; see
also Shekhar Darke, Note, To Be or Not to Be a Funding Portal: Why Crowdfunding Platforms Will Become Broker-Dealers, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 183
(2014) (arguing that providers will prefer to register as broker-dealers); cf.
Smith et al., supra (explaining SEC rules implement a variety of safeguards
applicable to crowdfunding platforms).
256. Currently this is a substantial deficiency in Proxyvote.com. Although
the site includes a hyperlink to the proxy statement, the webpage itself lacks
complete information on the issues for which voting instructions are sought and
investors who access the proxy statement through the hyperlink risk timing out
on the voting platform.
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Thus, if a platform contains a vote-with-management button, it
should also offer investors the option to vote against management. If the platform allows investors to vote in accordance with
the votes or guidelines of other investors, it should provide investors with those guidelines and/or the investors’ past voting
record. In addition, the site should not contain any language that
suggests or endorses a particular vote or voting policy.257
The SEC’s policy with respect to permitting platforms to
provide additional information is perhaps the most difficult issue, because the SEC has long taken the view that someone who
provides information to investors has endorsed the information
provided and may be liable if that information is inaccurate or
incomplete.258 In addition, the SEC may be wary of encouraging
platforms to provide links to information that is one-sided, unverified, or has the potential to mislead investors. Here, however, the SEC’s regulatory approach may need to reflect the reality that investors already have access to this information
through the Internet and that the collection or aggregation of
publicly-sourced information should not expose a platform to liability unless that information is modified or skewed. With respect to issues of distortion or bias, the SEC’s approach should
focus on the incentives for such distortion, rather than the provision of information.
Toward that end, perhaps the most significant safeguard
that the SEC can impose is a requirement that voting platforms
be free of conflicts of interest. The fundamental principles underlying this requirement are already contained in the proxy
rules, which distinguish those with an interest in the outcome of
a shareholder vote or a relationship with the participants from

257. Issuers and institutional investors will have ample incentives to monitor platforms and report instances of potential distortion or bias to the SEC,
which can address such conduct by using Rule 14a-9. Notably, Rule 14a-9 applies to prohibit proxy fraud even with respect to proxy solicitations that are
otherwise exempt from the proxy statement and filing requirements of Regulation 14A. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2017).
258. Indeed, the SEC failed to exempt crowdfunding intermediaries from liability for issuer fraud. See Alan Bickerstaff, Jeff C. Dodd & Ted Gilman, SEC
Adopts Rules to Allow Crowdfunding Beginning May 16, 2016, ANDREWS
KURTH INSIGHTS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.andrewskurth.com/insights-1284
.html (“The SEC specifically declined to exempt funding portals (or any intermediaries) from the statutory liability provision of Securities Act Section
4A(c).”).
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others. 259 The SEC rules should prohibit a voting platform or anyone that maintains a voting platform from having a financial
interest in an issuer, the subject of a shareholder vote, or a relationship to participants in an election contest. The regulations
should designate that voting platforms can only be funded by: (1)
issuers through the NYSE schedule under Regulation 14A or a
substantially similar fee structure; (2) brokers that are providing the platform for the benefit of their customers; or (3) customers themselves through direct fees. The regulations should explicitly prohibit platforms from receiving any form of
compensation from individuals or organizations who might have
a direct or indirect interest in the subject of a shareholder vote,
including proxy contest participants, advocacy groups, institutional investors such as hedge funds, and proxy advisory firms.
Finally, the SEC might decide that some issues are inherently case-specific and inappropriate for SVI. Accordingly, the
SEC rules might provide that a broker may not utilize SVI for
issues such as a merger or a contested election and must instead
provide notice to the customer at the time that the proxy statement is released and solicit voting instructions. In any cases in
which brokers are not permitted to use SVI, the rules should require them to notify SVI investors that their standing instructions do not apply and that their shares will not be voted unless
they take action.
The foregoing discussion offers a preliminary blueprint for
the introduction of voting platforms and SVI for use by retail investors. The market responses to this proposal cannot be predicted with certainty, and the SEC will need to continue to monitor voting platforms in the same way that it monitors the overall
proxy solicitation process. In particular, as with other aspects of
proxy voting, the SEC must police against bias, conflicts of interest, and potential fraud. The difficulty of this task is likely to be
minimal, however. A variety of interested participants in the
shareholder voting process, including institutional investors, issuers, and investor advocates, are likely to detect and reveal potential problems.
CONCLUSION
Despite the increasing importance of shareholder voting, retail investors have been largely excluded. Few retail investors
259. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (b)(1) (exempting certain solicitations
from the filing and proxy statement requirements but identifying various categories of interested persons for whom the exemption does not apply).
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vote their stock, and the mechanics of the voting process rarely
make it rational for them to do so. This Article advocates a solution to the problem—providing retail investors with access to a
voting platform analogous to those used by institutional investors. A voting platform that allows investors to obtain information and cast votes with respect to all their security positions,
submit SVI, and obtain information relevant to the voting decision would reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of the voting process.
The biggest obstacle to regulatory changes implementing
voting platforms and SVI is the concern that SVI would increase
uninformed voting. As this Article has demonstrated, however,
this risk is not specific to retail investors, nor likely to be exacerbated by SVI. Instead, this Article offers specific suggestions
as to the regulatory changes required to implement SVI and the
appropriate safeguards to protect investors. By creating the opportunity for market providers to meet the needs of retail investors, SVI offers the potential to bring greater legitimacy to shareholder voting.

